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OPENING THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR FOR 
CHILDREN WITH AIDS: THE EDUCATION FOR ALL 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT 
Margot R. Bodine* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is a fatal disease 
of limited communicability that destroys the body's natural ability 
to protect itself from infection. 1 At this writing, over 21,000 AIDS 
cases have already been reported in the United States with an 
estimated 40,000 additional cases expected to develop in the next 
two years. While initially the disease was thought to infect only 
homosexual men, AIDS has now struck virtually every sector of 
American society, including women, children and even a 66 year old 
nun.2 AIDS thus presents a significant public health issue that 
threatens the safety of the environment if its spread remains un-
checked. 
Attendant to the spread of the disease is an understandable, albeit 
somewhat irrational, public fear resulting in the exclusion of persons 
with AIDS from jobs, schools and social activities. 3 Such discrimi-
natory actions have spawned numerous legal battles,4 the most re-
* Solicitations, Articles, and Book Review Editor, 1986-1987, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRON-
MENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Wallis, AIDS: A Growing Threat, TIME, Aug. 12, 1985, at 40. 
2 Wallis, supra note 1, at 44. 
3 In addition to the exclusion of AIDS children from public school classrooms, there are 
many legal disputes involving employment discrimination claims, child custody fights, evic-
tions, insurance coverage, and public accommodation discrimination claims. For example, in 
Los Angeles an attorney suffered a heart attack. The paramedics who answered the call falsely 
thought he had AIDS and refused to touch him or otherwise assist him; in May of 1984, he 
filed a $1 million suit against the City of Los Angeles. See Flaherty, A Legal Emergency 
Brewing Over AIDS, 6 NAT'L L. J. at 1, col. 2, (July 9,1984) citing Bergman v. City of L.A., 
C497793 (L.A. County Superior Ct. 1984). 
• A spokesman for Rep. Henry A. Waxman, D-Cal., House Health Sub-Committee Chair-
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cent of which involves the exclusion of school children infected with 
the AIDS virus from a public school classroom. School districts in 
at least eight states and the District of Columbia have faced the 
issue. In academic year 1985-1986, children with AIDS were ex-
cluded from the public classroom in California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey and N ew York. 
Only Massachusetts and N ew York resolved the issue by allowing 
the children back in the classroom.5 Nationwide, the strong public 
reaction to AIDS has led to the psychological stigmatization and 
social ostracism of children with AIDS which seriouslY affects their 
educational and emotional development. 6 
As more and more children are diagnosed as having AIDS,7 legal 
advocates increasingly will be called upon to represent such children. 
Local school boards possess a long-recognized and broad authority 
to manage the public schools and to exclude children deemed to pose 
a health hazard to other children in the classroom.8 Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court has held that public education is not a funda-
man, stated that as of July of 1984 twelve AIDS related legal disputes were reported per day. 
Id. at 1, col.2. 
5 Tarr, AIDS: The Legal Issues Widen, 8 NAT'L L.J. col. 1-2, at 1, 29 (Nov. 25, 1985). 
6 This social ostracism has been termed the "leper syndrome" by Dr. David Cohn of Denver 
Disease Control. In the Queens case, the identity of one of the four children with AIDS was 
disclosed; the child was taken out of school to avoid "psychological damage from harassment." 
Adler, Greenberg, Hager, McKiliup & Namuth, The AIDS Conflict, CVI NEWSWEEK 18, 20 
(Sept. 23, 1985) [hereinafter Adler]. Similarly, in Carmel, California, an eight-year-old he-
mophiliac who was infected with AIDS through contaminated blood was removed from school 
to avoid the psychological ill effects of the schoolchildren's and officials' reaction to his disease. 
See id. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in its recommendations on the education and 
care of AIDS infected children noted the "potential for social isolation should the child's 
condition become known to others in the care of educational setting," and thus reiterated the 
need for confidentiality in these cases, CDC, Education and Foster Care of Children Infected 
with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type lI1I Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 34 MOR-
BIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. ("MMWR") 517, 518 (Aug. 30, 1985) [hereinafter 
Education]. Furthermore, the American Psychological Association adopted a resolution on 
Feb. 1, 1986 condemning indiscriminate testing to detect exposure to AIDS. The psychologists 
recommended that psychosocial and mental health aspects should be stressed in treatment 
and should be made widely available to AIDS patients. 1 AIDS POLICY & LAW 5 (Feb. 12, 
1986). AIDS POLICY & LAW, (APL) , is a bi-weekly newspaper published by Buraff Publica-
tions, Inc., a subsidiary of the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., focusing on the most current 
practical and legal developments with regard to AIDS. AIDS POLICY & LAW is a major source 
of information for employers, practitioners and scholars researching AIDS-related issues. 
7 As of Feb. 11, 1986, at least 191 cases were reported to the CDC. These cases represent 
only the most severe form of the infection, thus, an even greater number of children may 
have a milder form of the disease or may be asymptomatic. Dist. 27 Community School Bd. 
v. Bd. of Education of New York City, No. 14940/85, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 
1986). 
8 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 55 (West 1982). 
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mental right that is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. 9 These obstacles, as well as a provincial attitude taken by 
courts in past disease cases,1O have caused the legal community to 
recognize that protecting the rights of these children to be educated 
with their peers is a significant, although problematic, legal chal-
lenge. 
New York City's celebrated battle to keep children with AIDS in 
the classroom was not easily won.l1 The New York City Board of 
Education's announcement that it would not automatically exclude 
children with AIDS touched off a lawsuit by the local school boards 
and parents and caused a boycott of the schools by at least 18,000 
children12• After a five week trial and three months of deliberation, 
the Queens Supreme Court endorsed the City's decision. In District 
27 Community School Board v. Board of Education of New York 
City,13 the court held that the City had not violated state or local 
public health laws for several reasons: AIDS had not been legisla-
tively classified as a communicable disease; it did not pose a health 
threat in the classroom if certain precautions were taken; and chil-
dren with AIDS are handicapped within the meaning of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973. 14 At this writing, the Queens Supreme Court 
is the only court to rule on the school exclusion issue. 
As state legislatures begin to react to the public fear of the syn-
drome by amending laws to exclude persons with AIDS from schools 
and public accommodations, 15 the efficacy of legislative remedies such 
9 San Antonio School District et al. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-38 (1972). 
10 See infra notes 83-105 and accompanying text. In the Queens case, one unidentified 
second grader was admitted to public school pursuant to the City's policy of evaluating each 
child diagnosed with the syndrome on a case-by-case basis. The second grader was actually 
only one of four identified AIDS children in the N ew York City school system; one is too ill 
to attend school and is being tutored in the hospital; one was removed from school until a 
foster home is found, and one was removed when his/her identity was discovered in order to 
prevent psychological damage. See authorities cited supra note 6. 
11 Dist. 27 Community School Bd., No. 14949/85, slip op. 
12 For a contemporary news media account of the Queens case, see Adler, supra note 6, at 
18-24. 
13 No. 14949/85, slip op. 
14 [d. at 34-35, 46, 55. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. I 
1983), a broad civil rights law protecting handicapped individuals from discrimination is 
discussed infra notes 213-42 and accompanying text. 
15 The Florida legislature has introduced two proposals that would prevent teachers and 
students with AIDS from sharing classrooms with healthy peers. House Bill 137 would allow 
the State Department of Education to screen district teachers and students if there existed 
"probable cause" to believe they had AIDS. The bill would empower local school boards to 
release teachers with AIDS with pay and to separate students with AIDS from the rest of 
the school population. These children would be allowed to be taught by teachers with AIDS. 
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as the Rehabilitation Act becomes apparent. Statutory classification 
of AIDS as a handicap safeguards the AIDS child's right to education 
where constitutional theories fall short. Successful classification of 
AIDS as a handicap in the employment discrimination context,16 as 
well as the application of the Rehabilitation Act to tuberculosis, 17 
further suggest that the classification of certain contagious diseases 
as handicaps is gaining increased acceptance in the legal commu-
nity.18 After District 27 Community School Board,l9 the central 
inquiry includes not only whether AIDS can be classified as a hand-
icap, but what statute best accommodates the AIDS child in the 
education context. At the federal level, there are two applicable 
statutes: the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (§ 504)20 and the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).21 
While the Rehabilitation Act ultimately proves an effective theory 
upon which to base an AIDS child's claim, it simply prohibits dis-
The second bill, introduced in the Senate, is similar to the House bill but in addition would 
require the state Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to inform school boards 
of students and employees reported to have the disease. The Senate bill would also require 
pre-employment testing and would apply to kitchen workers as well. 1 APL 7 (Jan. 29,1986). 
While the state of New Jersey has implemented a policy which permits a medical panel to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether students with AIDS can attend school, two New Jersey 
school districts have mounted an appellate challenge, arguing that this policy is an infringement 
on local school boards' authority to set local school policy in state appellate court. The decision 
is pending. 1 APL 7 (Jan. 29, 1986). 
16 See id. at 1-2, citing Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and Mgt. Pol., 
Fla. Comm. on Human Relations [FCHR] No. 85-0624, (Dec. 11, 1985), appealJiled; Dist. 27 
Community Sclwol Bd., No. 14940/85, slip op. at 55, citing People v. 49 W.12 St. Tenants 
Corp. (N.Y.Sup. Ct., New York County, Oct. 17, 1983). See generally Leonard, Employment 
Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 10 DAYTON L.REV. 681 (1985). 
17 Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759, 764 (11th Cir. 1985). 
18 See Mancusi, AIDS Fear Spawns Legal Battles, Boston Globe, Sept. 29, 1985, at 1, 18, 
col. 6. See also Flaherty, supra note 3, at 44, col. 4; Blodgett, Despite the Public's Hands-off 
Attitude Toward AIDS, Tlwse Woo Discriminate Against the Disease's Victims Are Finding 
No Immunity From the Law, 12 STUD. LAW. 8 (Jan. 1984). 
In addition, Law Journal Seminars-Press cites the issue of whether AIDS is a handicap 
protected by anti-discrimination statutes as a topic of discussion at its professional seminar, 
"AIDS: Legal Aspects of a Medical Crisis." 8 NAT'L L.J. 40 (Nov. 25, 1985). The seminar is 
one of a number of such legal forums across the nation designed to educate practitioners and 
the public about AIDS. See also American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee 
on continuing Professional Education, "AIDS and the Law," Video Law Review Program (live 
video telecast airing in 43 U.S. cities); Massachusetts Dep't of Public Health, Public Health 
Rounds, "AIDS: A Status Report," State House (Oct. 8, 1985)(public health forum), National 
Lawyer's Guild-Boston College Law School Chapter, Boston College Law School Women's 
Law Center, "AIDS: A Legal Frontier," (Feb. 5, 1986). 
19 No. 14940/85, slip op. The school boards are not appealing the decision. 1 APL 7 (Feb. 
26, 1986). 
"" 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). 
21 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
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crimination on the basis of handicap. It provides neither supportive 
services to aid the handicapped child, nor procedural safeguards to 
protect the child's rights at the outset or during the pendency of an 
appeal. The result is that the child with AIDS may remain excluded 
from the classroom for many months. Since there is currently no 
known cure for AIDS, the excluded child's battle to return to the 
classroom is essentially a battle against time; if his rights are not 
protected while he pursues his claim, he may not live long enough 
to exercise them once vindicated. 
This article suggests that a child with AIDS may more effectively 
litigate his case if he is classified as handicapped under the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 as well as the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973. EAHCA is broad, remedial legislation that pro-
tects the rights of handicapped children to a "free appropriate edu-
cation" in a classroom with their peers "to the maximum extent 
possible." The focus of this article is on the applicability of EAHCA 
to AIDS as an additional legislative protection for an excluded child. 
The application of EAHCA to the AIDS child would entitle the child 
to a panoply of federally mandated procedural safeguards that he 
does not necessarily receive when proceeding solely under the Re-
habilitation Act. Classification of AIDS as a handicap under EAH-
CA's narrower definition will foster acceptance of the concept by 
administrative bodies in the initial evaluation of AIDS children. 
Marshalling the protections of two federal acts for the handicapped 
strengthens the AIDS child's claims. Application of EAHCA avoids 
the onus and expense of constitutional litigation and encourages a 
successful and speedy resolution of these cases by administrative 
bodies on the local level. In addition, the Act provides the handi-
capped child with a private right of action to the federal courts once 
his administrative remedies are exhausted. 
The first section of the article describes the disease including its 
transmissibility and treatment. The next section presents the legal 
controversy involved, discussing both the past judicial treatment of 
diseased persons and the inadequacies of traditional constitutional 
arguments in protecting the rights of children with AIDS. The article 
next suggests the more cogent analysis of classifying AIDS as a 
handicap rather than as a disease, focusing on EAHCA and the 
protections it provides. This section analyzes how EAHCA's statu-
tory language and its regulations permit a similar classification of 
AIDS. The section also compares the child's protections under 
EACHA with those offered under the Rehabilitation Act. Finally, 
the article suggests both a model for judicial implementation of AIDS 
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as a handicap under EAHCA and the proper standard of review to 
be adopted by administrative bodies and courts. 
II. THE DISEASE 
AIDS directly inhibits the body's immune system, specifically its 
capacity to produce antibodies to fight infection. When a foreign 
agent enters the body, a healthy immune system identifies it and 
forms antibodies to fight it. AIDS is caused by a virus,22 usually 
accompanied by a number of incompletely identified co-factors, that 
enters the body to attack and eventually destroy helper-T lympho-
cyte cells, the cells which, under normal circumstances, initiate the 
production of, antibodies when a foreign agent is present.23 Without 
the healthy functioning of the helper-T cells to destroy foreign 
agents, fatal infections or rare cancers known as opportunistic infec-
tions are able to develop unimpeded. 24 
The opportunistic infections ,associated with the acute form of 
AIDS are Kaposi's sarcoma (KS), a rare form of skin cancer, and 
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP), a parasitic infection of the 
lungs. 25 These infections vary in intensity. Many individuals exposed 
to the virus develop less severe physical symptoms, generally known 
as AIDS-related complex (ARC).26 These symptoms, which may 
precurse acute AIDS,27 include swollen glands, weight loss, extreme 
fatigue, night sweats, diarrhea, and a decrease in helper-T lympho-
22 See "Public Health Fact Sheet," published by Massachusetts Dept. of Health (August 
1985). 
23 Leonard, supra note 16, at 684. 
24 For a layman's explanation of how AIDS affects the body's immune system, see Wallis, 
supra note 1, at 43 . 
25 Approximately 85% of all AIDS patients studied have one or both of these diseases. KS 
usually manifests itself in the form of blue-violet or brownish bruise-like spots on the skin or 
in the mouth. PCP, a form of severe pneumonia, is characterized by cough, fever and breathing 
difficulties. Other opportunistic infections associated with AIDS are cytomegalovirus, herpes-
virus, and parasites such as toxoplasma or cryptosporidia. "Facts About AIDS," U.S. Dept. 
of Health and Human Services-Public Health Service, fact sheet (August 1985). In the fall of 
1985, another research team found that in a minority of cases, the AIDS virus directly attacks 
the spinal cord and the brain causing dementia and severe motor dysfunction. Serrill, A 
Scourge Spreads Panic, TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 50-51; Schmeck, Grim New Ravage of AIDS: 
Brain Damage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1985, at Cl, col. 2. 
26 Wallis, supra note 1, at 42. 
27 The CDC has defined AIDS as "a reliably diagnosed disease that is at least modererately 
indicative of an underlying cellular immunodeficiency in a person who has had no known 
underlying cause of cellular immunodeficiency nor any cause of reduced resistance reported 
to be associated with that disease. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Update-
United States, 32 CDC, MMWR 310 (June 24, 1983). 
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cyte cell counts. 28 Still others who have been exposed to the virus 
either never develop the disease or do not develop symptoms of 
AIDS for several years.29 While exposure to the virus thus does not 
invariably lead to death,30 the sometimes lengthy incubation period31 
can mask the fact that a person has the disease. The infected person 
may then unwittingly place other persons at risk. An unknown but 
potentially large number of individuals may therefore be at risk. 
The first case of AIDS, as defined by the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) in Atlanta,32 was reported in 1981. As of June 1986, 
over 21,000 cases33 had been reported in the United States, with an 
estimated 500,000 to one million persons already exposed to the 
virus. 34 One hundred ninety-one of these cases were reported among 
children under 18 years of age. 35 Thirty-six per cent of the cases in 
the United States are reported from the state of New York; approx-
28 "Facts About AIDS," supra note 25. 
29 According to estimates by the CDC, the Nat'l Cancer Inst. and other private researchers, 
persons exposed to the AIDS virus have a 10-30% chance of developing severe AIDS, 
generally characterized by the appearance of KS and/or PCP. In addition, researchers agree 
that 20--30% of those exposed will develop ARC, while the balance of those infected will never 
develop symptoms. GAY MEN'S HEALTH CRISIS, INC., Health Letter No.5, at 3 (May 1985) 
[hereinafter GMHC-5]. The GMHC is a non-profit organization formed in 1982 by homosexual 
men in N ew York City to respond to the AIDS epidemic. In addition to publishing the health 
letter, which contains the most recent information on AIDS, the GMHC counsels patients, 
provides legal services and informs the public. Leonard, supra note 16, at 681-82 n.3. 
3. At the point when 17,000 cases had been reported, over 8800 resulted in fatality. Eckholm, 
Study of AIDS Victims' Families Doubts Disease is Transmitted Casually, N. Y. Times, Feb. 
6, 1986, at B7, col. 2. 
31 The incubation period is thought to range from six months to five years and possibly 
longer. "Facts About AIDS," supra note 25. 
32 The CDC, established in 1973 as an operating health agency within the Public Health 
Service, is the federal agency charged with "protecting the public health of the Nation by 
providing leadership and direction in the prevention and control of diseases and other pre-
ventable conditions . . . ." Part of its function is to develop and implement programs to deal 
with environmental health problems. THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT MANUAL 1984/85, 
273 (May 1, 1984). 
33 Memorandum of Ass't Att'y Gen. Charles J. Cooper to Ronald E. Robinson, General 
Counsel, Dep't of Health & Human Serv., "On Application of § 504 of Rehab. Act to Persons 
with AIDS," reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 122 at D-1 (June 25, 1986) [hereinafter 
DOJ Opin.]. 
34 This is most likely a conservative estimate. NEWSWEEK magazine noted that the CDC 
"has quietly been referring to an upper limit of 2 million." Adler, supra note 6, at 18. In 
addition, recent studies conducted at the National Institute of Health indicate that the CDC's 
figures "may be a significant underestimate, given emerging data concerning unexpectedly 
high rates of seropositivity [indicating a presence of infection] in some risk groups .... " 
Wong-Staal & Gallo, Human T-lymphotropic retroviruses, 317 NATURE 395, 401 (Oct. 3, 
1985). 
35 See Dist. 27 Community School Bd., No. 14940/85, slip op. at 1. 
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imately twenty-three per cent are reported from California.36 Cases 
have been reported in 46 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto 
Rico, and more than 35 other countries.37 There is currently no 
known cure for the disease. 38 
The identification of the AIDS virus in 1983-84,39 combined with 
the discovery of AIDS in hemophiliacs and recipients of donor blood 
in addition to homosexual men and intravenous drug users,40 con-
firmed medical findings that AIDS is communicated through an ex-
change of body fluids. Researchers then isolated high concentrations 
of the organism in the blood and semen of AIDS patients. 
36 "Facts About AIDS," supra note 25. 
37 ld. For a more detailed account of the history of the AIDS epidemic, see Comment, 
AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON L. REV. 717, 718-22 (1984). 
38 Vigorous research in several countries continues in a search for an anti-viral drug to kill 
the AIDS virus, as well as for drugs that will resolve the disease manifestations and/or will 
resolve immune imbalance in patients. Some anti-viral drugs which have been effective in 
inhibiting the AIDS virus have produced debilitating side effects such as kidney damage. 
These drugs include HPA-23, Suramin and interferon-alpha. Although no treatment has been 
successful in restoring the immune system of an AIDS patient, doctors have had some success 
in using drugs, chemotherapy and surgery to treat the opportunistic infections of AIDS 
patients. "Facts About AIDS, supra note 25; GMHC-5, supra note 29, at 4; Wallis, supra 
note 1, at 47. 
Two Harvard Medical School research teams have made breakthroughs in AIDS research. 
The teams discovered how the AIDS virus can amplify its own production one thousand-fold, 
a finding that may facilitate the development of a vaccine as well as anti-AIDS drug therapy. 
The researchers have also discovered that antibodies that may deactivate the virus are present 
in the saliva of AIDS and ARC patients. This may explain why the disease is not transmitted 
through saliva and may lead to a saliva test for exposure to the virus. Knox, Clue to AIDS 
Virus Growth Found, Boston Globe, Feb. 12, 1986, at AI, col. 1. 
39 In 1983, a French research team led by Dr. Luc Montagnier at the Pasteur Institute in 
Paris discovered a new virus called Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus (LA V) thought to be 
the suspected cause of AIDS. In April of 1984, a federal research team led by Dr. Robert C. 
Gallo at the Nat'! Inst. of Health identified another virus, human T-celllymphotrophic virus 
(variant III) (HTLV-III), as the conclusive virus causing AIDS. Gallo contends that the two 
viruses are variants of the same virus; Montagnier contends that the two viruses are identical. 
In sum, there is some disagreement over who deserves credit for the actual discovery of the 
virus which causes AIDS. Leonard, supra note 16, at 684 n.12; Comment, supra note 37, at 
724 n.87; Wallis, supra note 1, at 42. 
40 Consonant with the established modes of transmission, the CDC has identified specific, 
publicly identifiable high risk groups, namely, 1) sexually active homosexual and bisexual men 
with multiple partners (73% of all cases); 2) present or past intravenous drug users (17%); 3) 
individuals who have had transfusions with blood or blood products (2%); 4) individuals with 
hemophilia or other coagulation disorders (1%); and 5) heterosexual contacts of an individual 
with AIDS or at risk for AIDS (1%). 6% of all AIDS patients do not appear to fall into any 
of these categories. "Facts About AIDS," supra note 25. See also Evatt, Coincidental Ap-
pearance of LAVIHTLV-III Antibodies in Hemophiliacs and the Onset of the AIDS Epidemic, 
312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 483 (Feb. 21, 1985). Haitians, once thought to be a high risk group, 
were dropped by the CDC as a high risk category in early 1985 when the CDC discovered 
that many of the Haitian men, though not avowed homosexuals, had peddled sex to gay men 
because they were impoverished. Wallis, supra note 1, at 42. 
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The primary modes of transmission of the AIDS virus are: 1) 
sexual intercourse with an infected person;41 2) transfusions of in-
fected blood;42 3) parenteral penetration through use of a contami-
nated needle;43 and 4) in the case of a newborn, through childbirth; 
a fetus can be infected in utero or during birth from its mother's 
blood. 44 
The majority of children with AIDS contract the virus from their 
infected mothers in the perinatal stage. Seventy per cent of the 
pediatric cases reported involve children whose parent either had 
AIDS or was a member of a high risk group for AIDS; twenty per 
cent of all AIDS children contracted the virus from receiving blood 
or blood products; for the remaining ten per cent, investigations are 
incomplete. 45 
While low concentrations of the AIDS virus have been isolated in 
tears and saliva, no cases have been contracted through either of 
these fluids. 46 Although saliva and tears are highly inefficient meth-
ods of transmission,47 they have not been conclusively ruled out as 
41 Infected semen that comes in contact with broken blood vessels or lesions in the anus or 
vagina during intercourse is by far the leading mode of infection. Accordingly, certain patterns 
regarding sexual transmission have developed: men can transmit AIDS to other men through 
anal intercourse; men can transmit AIDS to women through vaginal intercourse. While HTL v-
III/LA V is carried in women's blood, whether it is present in vaginal secretions is still being 
studied. A recent Swedish study of patrons of an AIDS-infected prostitute supports the theory 
that women can transmit the virus to men. Brody, Separating the Myths and Fears from, the 
Facts on How AIDS Is and Isn't Transmitted, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1986, at C6, col. 3. 
Thus far, women have not given the virus to other women sexually. Church, Not an Easy 
Disease to Come By, TIME, Sept. 23, 1985, at 27; "Facts About Aids," supra note 25. 
42 "Facts About AIDS," supra note 25. Medical researchers have developed a test which is 
99% accurate in detecting whether HTLV-IIIILAV antibodies are present in blood; this 
screening mechanism at blood donation sites is effectively eradicating future cases of AIDS 
caused by infected blood transfusions. The test is known as the enzyme-linked immunosorbent 
assay (ELISA). Id. While termed a break-through in AIDS research, the screening test poses 
grave privacy issues as health authorities, insurance companies and employers seek to use 
the test to identify potential carriers in spite of their present good health. Adler, supra note 
6, at 18. See also, South Florida Blood Service v. Rasmussen, 467 So.2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1985)(plaintiff in tort litigation, who suffered AIDS after transfusion, denied order 
seeking names of blood donors as violative of zone of privacy.); Osterholm,. Screening Donated 
Blood and Plasma for HTLV-Ill Antibody: Facing More Than One Crisis?, 312 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1185 (May 2, 1985); Landesman, The AIDS Epidemic, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 521 
(Feb. 21, 1985) . 
.. "Facts About AIDS," supra note 25. 
"Id . 
.. Education, supra note 6, at 518. 
46Id. 
47 Adler, supra note 6, at 21. Nevertheless, the GMHC cautioned in its newsletter that 
because saliva may harbor infected lymphocytes, "so-called 'deep kissing', involving an ex-
change of saliva, may present some degree of risk, however low." GMHC-5, supra note 29, 
at 4. 
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a means of communication. Researchers state that exposure to much 
higher levels of the virus is necessary to cause infection;48 the pos-
sibility that an abundance of an AIDS patient's tears could enter the 
blood stream of another is extremely low. The virus has not been 
detected in perspiration, urine or feces. 49 The lifespan of the virus 
outside of the human body is short. It cannot be spread through 
contact with door knobs, dishes, utensils, or toilet seats. Once the 
virus is dry, it is dead. 50 
Of the over 17,000 reported AIDS cases in the United States, none 
are known to have been transmitted in the school, day-care, foster-
care or health care settings. 51 Similarly, there are no reports of the 
virus developing between an AIDS patient and members of his 
family with whom he has maintained an intimate but non-sexual 
relationship. 52 In sum, epidemiological studies show that, in order 
to contract AIDS, there must be either sexual contact or blood-to-
blood contact. 
Based on these findings, the casual person-to-person contact that 
would occur among schoolchildren - being in the same room with 
an AIDS child, sharing a meal or a bathroom with him, hugging or 
socially kissing him - does not pose a risk of transmitting AIDS.53 
As a precaution, the CDC and numerous state and local health 
organizations have developed detailed guidelines for the education 
48 Seligmann with Gosnell, AIDS: Myth and Reality, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 20-
21. 
49 Carey, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 30, 1985, at 48. The virus has also not been 
isolated in breast milk, but researchers are pursuing this route. I d. 
50 Seligmann with Gosnell, supra note 48, at 21. 
51 Education, supra note 6, at 518. In Britain, a nurse did contract the disease when she 
was accidentally pricked with a contaminated needle, not through the casual contact of nursing 
an AIDS victim. Church, supra note 41, at 27. 
52 Church, supra note 41, at 27. In fact, a recent research study analyzing members of the 
families of AIDS patients provides conclusive evidence that AIDS cannot be spread through 
close, day-to-day contact. The Montefiore Medical Center study conducted in cooperation with 
the CDC examined 101 household members who had hugged and kissed AIDS patients and 
shared toothbrushes, drinking glasses, beds, towels and toilets with them. No family member 
of any victim of the disease has developed AIDS apart from those who had sexual relations 
with a carrier, abused intravenous drugs, or contracted it by any other established mode of 
transmission. Friedland, Lack of Transmission of HTLV-IIIILAV Infection to Household 
Contacts of Patients With AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 344-49 (Feb. 6, 1986). See also Eckholm, supra note 30, at B7, col. 1. 
Federal health officials have reported, however, one known case of the transmission of the 
AIDS virus by a child to his parent, but "emphasized that the situation was an unusual one 
that did not contradict evidence that AIDS is not spread through normal household contact." 
The child's mother was a nurse who was described by the CDC as "closely involved in the 
child's care during hospitalization and at home." Boston Globe, Feb. 7, 1986, at 3, col. 4. 
63 Education, supra note 6, at 519; Friedland, supra note 52, passim. 
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of AIDS children. 54 For example, if an AIDS child has skin eruptions 
or open lesions, exhibits inappropriate behavior that would increase 
the likelihood of transmission, such as a propensity to bite or fre-
quent incontinence, or if the child's immune status is at a point where 
he himself is at a greater risk of encountering infectious agents, that 
child cannot attend school. 55 These guidelines protect healthy school 
children from any theoretical transmission that could result from 
exposure of open skin lesions or mucous membranes to blood or 
other body fluids of an infected child. 56 While medical experts cannot 
prove that AIDS will never be transmitted through casual contact, 57 
five years of research58 and tracking of the disease have not produced 
a single case that has been transmitted other than through sexual 
intercourse or an exchange of blood, activities which do not occur in 
the public school classroom. 
III. THE AIDS CHILD'S RIGHT TO EDUCATION - THE LEGAL 
OBSTACLES 
While the social, emotional and medical controversies surrounding 
the AIDS epidemic continue to preoccupy the media, it is the legal 
basis of the AIDS child's right to attend public school that is the 
more significant courtroom controversy. The conflict involves two 
legal arguments. School boards argue that the presence of AIDS 
children within the public schools is injurious to the public health, 
64 See, e.g., Education, supra note 6, at 519-20; "AIDS/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome School Attendance Policy," published by Mass. Dept. of Pub. Health (Sept. 6, 1985)(not 
intended for day care); "Guidelines for Children with AIDS/ARC Attending School," published 
by the Ind. State Bd. of Health, (July 1985). These guidelines also provide standard operating 
asepsis procedures for when an AIDS child has an accident or injury at school or when 
vomitus, blood, or urine must be cleaned up by staff. 
55 [d. 
56 Education, supra note 6, at 519. 
57 Medical testimony in the Queens case correctly pointed out that medical science never 
has been governed by a "no risk" standard. To do so would effect "utter paralysis" upon 
treatment of disease and medical research. As one expert testified, 
It's hard for me to conjure up any of the important prevention or treatment activity 
that we engage in that is risk free. Whether it's the risk associated with polio 
immunization, where we know that we have changed dramatically the health of the 
United States and much of the world ... or the risk of serious allergic reaction to 
penicillin which may be fatal, [w]e accept that risk. 
Dist. 27 Community School Bd., No. 14940/85, slip op. at 48. 
58 The federal allocation of funds for AIDS research has sky-rocketed from $5.5 million in 
1982 to $106.5 million for 1985. A House appropriations subcommittee recently approved about 
$196 million for AIDS research and education programs, including $141 million for the National 
Institutes of Health in Washington, D.C. Thomas, The New Untouchables, TIME, Sept. 23, 
1985, at 26. 
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therefore the state's police power justifies their exclusion. 59 While 
conceding that transmission of AIDS by means other than sexual 
contact or exposure to infected blood products appears unlikely, the 
school boards next argue that there is still some risk of transmission 
of AIDS through the normal school contacts and accidents children 
routinely experience.60 Essentially, because medical knowledge of 
the disease is only in its incipient stages, the medical evidence cannot 
establish that allowing children with AIDS in the schools is entirely 
risk-free. Where even a slight risk of such devastating character 
exists, the school board argues that it is bound by state law to 
exclude AIDS children in the interests of public health and welfare. 61 
In response, the AIDS child, his parents, and the state boards of 
health and education assert that a local school board's exclusion of 
an AIDS child is an unreasonable exercise of the board's authority. 62 
This argument is based primarily upon the existing knowledge re-
garding the disease - namely, that AIDS is not communicable 
through casual contact and thus would not cause a public health 
threat in the school context.63 Since AIDS cannot be transmitted 
through such everyday contact as would occur in the classroom, the 
school board's means - total exclusion from the classroom - are 
not justified by its end purpose of preventing the spread of AIDS in 
the schools. 64 In pending cases, attorneys are arguing that such 
exclusion violates the child's civil rights under the equal protection 
and due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions,65 
59 See Kirk v. Wyman Bd. of Health, 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E.387 (1909). "Statutes and ordinances 
requiring . . . the isolation of infected persons, when necessary for the protection of public 
health, do not violate the constitutional guaranty of the right of enjoyment of liberty and 
property, because neither the right to liberty nor the right to property extends to the use of 
liberty or property to the injury of others . . . . The individual has no more right to the 
freedom of spreading disease by carrying contagion on his person, than he has to produce 
disease by maintaining his property in a noisome condition." 83 S.C. at 378, 65 S.E. at 389. 
60 Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, White v. 
Western School Corp., IP-85-1192-C, at 9 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 16, 1985); Amended Petition, Dist. 
27 Community School Rd., No. 14940/85, slip op. at 47-48 (filed Sept. 11, 1985). In the White 
case, the defendant school board was arguing against a motion for preliminary injunction of 
the exclusion of Ryan White. Its argument was thus framed in terms of the elements for 
preliminary injunction - that the public interest and the balance of harms required denial of 
the motion for preliminary injunction. See Defendant's Memorandum, id. 
61Id. 
62 Complaint, White, No. IP-85-1192-C, at 4 (S.D.Ind. filed Aug. 8, 1985); Verified Answer, 
Dist. 27 Community School Rd., No. 14940/85, at 11 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 18, 1985). 
63 White, Complaint, supra note 62, at 4--5 . 
.. "In passing upon such [health] regulations ... the courts consider, first, whether inter-
ference with personal liberty or property was reasonably necessary to the public health, and 
second, if the means used and the extent of the interference were reasonably necessary for 
the accomplishment of the purpose to be attained." Kirk, 83 S.C. at 380, 65 S.E. at 390. 
65 "The Plaintiff is entitled to such equal accommodations, advantages and privileges, and 
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the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,66 the Civil Rights Act,67 and the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.68 
Numerous legal obstacles confront the advocate who represents a 
child infected with AIDS. He must determine what rights a child 
with a contagious, infectious disease has to attend public school, and 
how the applicable standard of review under the Constitution will 
affect his case. 69 He must contend with 1) the state's broad power 
to regulate in the contagious disease context pursuant to its common 
law police power and 2) the school board's long recognized authority 
to manage the public schools and to exclude children with infectious 
diseases. 7o He must also assess his chances of success in view of the 
rather provincial judicial treatment of past disease cases.71 Until 
recently, courts have not applied an objective standard of review in 
cases involving diseased persons.72 In sum, he must recognize the 
weak legal protections afforded diseased persons under the law and 
scrutinize alternative legal classifications73 that provide a sounder 
legal footing for protecting his client's rights. 74 
This section explores the inefficacy of arguing that a child with 
AIDS has the right to attend public school under the equal protection 
to equal treatment and rights with other persons as citizens of the United States, in the use 
and enjoyment of the facilities of said schools and to equal treatment with other persons and 
equal protection of the laws in the use and enjoyment of such privileges as provided and 
afforded to other persons at all times when the same is open and used by them. Therefore, 
... Defendants ... violated Plaintiff's civil rights and denied him equal protection of the law 
as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Indiana Consitution." Complaint, 
supra note 62, at 5-6. 
66 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is discussed more fully infra notes 213-42 and accom-
panying text. 
f{/42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 
68 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461. See infra notes 150-242 and accompanying text. 
69 See infra notes 106-37 and accompanying text. 
70 See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text. 
71 See infra notes 83-105 and accompanying text. 
72 Id. 
'130ne alternative legal standard that could operate as an effective analogue with AIDS is 
the involuntary institutionalization standard. Before a state may commit an individual to a 
mental institution, the due process clause requires the state to afford that individual a hearing 
and to justify the confinement by clear and convincing proof "more substantial than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979). The state must 
prove that the individual is mentally ill, and that he is dangerous to himself and/or others. 
Id. at 420. By analogy, the assignment of an AIDS child to a separate classroom or alternative 
educational placement outside the mainstream is a form of involuntary commitment which 
similarly requires due process safeguards - a hearing judged according to the clear and 
convincing proof standard. While this standard may create a higher burden of proof for school 
boards, it is undesireable because it requires judicial intervention in the first instance in lieu 
of allowing local administrative bodies their right to determine the child's educational place-
ment. 
7. See infra notes 150-230 and accompanying text. 
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and due process clauses of the Constitution. First, there is a brief 
discussion of society's perception of disease, and then an analysis of 
how courts have decided exclusion cases involving diseased persons 
through the application of a subjective, rather than objective stan-
dard of review. The next section of the article analyzes the status of 
a claimed right to education under the Constitution, as well as the 
inviolability of equal protection and substantive due process theories 
as remedies. The next section focuses on the state's common law 
police power to exclude persons with contagious diseases as well as 
the statutory power of school boards to so regulate. The section 
concludes with the proposition that traditional constitutional theories 
are not the AIDS child's strongest protection against exclusionary 
school policies because the rational basis standard of review inherent 
to these theories presents an easily surmountable burden for school 
boards. 
A. Past Judicial Treatment of Disease Cases 
Disease evokes a negative social reaction; it inspires fear and 
denial. 75 Adults with AIDS suffer from social stigmatization a a 
result of the disease's association with lifestyles considered deviant 
by many.76 A similarly repellant response to the development of 
AIDS in children is, however, inexplicable where the disease is not 
the result of sexual or social practices, or where the child is not 
diseased at all, but merely is a carrier of the virus. 
Apart from any moral censure, AIDS provokes negative social 
reaction because it is both fatal and imprecisely understood; it is a 
medical mystery in a profession that operates on the premise that 
diseases can be cured. 77 As Susan Sontag observes in Illness as 
Metaphor,78 
75 See generally S. SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978) and Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 665, 668-69 (1962), Douglas, J., concurring (discussion of ancient beliefs that disease 
represented punishment for sin). Despite the highly sophisticated and technical state of medical 
science, society still tends to shy away from confronting some diseases. A stroke of apoplexy 
is still commonly referred to as a "shock." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2099 
(1981). Sontag cites Dr. Karl Menninger's observation that "the very word 'cancer' is said to 
kill some patients who would not have succumbed (so quickly) to the malignancy." Id. at 6. 
Sontag posits that tuberculosis had a similar effect in the nineteenth century. Id. 
76 "Public Health Fact Sheet," supra note 22. The disease is identified with its high risk 
groups: homosexual men, drug addicts, and prostitutes who have sexual relations with mem-
bers of the high risk groups. 
77 SONTAG, supra note 75, at 5. 
78 SONTAG, supra note 75. 
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disease itself . . . arouses thoroughly old-fashioned kinds of 
dread. Any disease that is treated as a mystery and acutely 
enough feared will be felt to be morally, if not literally, conta-
gious . . . . Contact with someone afflicted with a disease re-
garded as a mysterious malevolency inevitably feels like a tres-
pass; worse, like the violation of a taboo .... [Disease] is felt to 
be obscene - in the original meaning of that word: ill-omened, 
abominable, repugnant to the senses . . . . The metaphors at-
tached to [disease] imply living processes of a particularly reso-
nant and horrid kind. 79 
597 
While the disease metes out the death sentence, it is the patient 
who is made culpable. 80 Diseases with such lethal effects are an evil 
"not to be managed and treated," but "to be attacked."81 While 
desiring to punish disease, society instead punishes its victims; dis-
ease as a demonic enemy is not only fatal but shamefu1.82 Society's 
fear of AIDS and other fatal diseases thus provokes an anathematic 
response, even where the infected person shows no symptoms and 
the risk of contagion is minimal. The diseased are socially excluded 
before they are legislatively or judicially excluded. 
The court system, in its own treatment of diseased persons, has 
to a certain extent mirrored social sentiment. As far back as the 
Middle Ages,83 the law has handled diseased persons with a similar 
791d. at 6, 9. 
80 ld. at 57, 8l. 
81 ld. at 8l. 
82 ld. at 57. 
83 Individuals with leprosy were dealt with particularly severely in the Middle Ages. Termed 
simply "lepers" as their personal identities and physical maladies merged in the eyes of society, 
lepers were quarantined in colonies or lazar houses, hospitals for lepers. Once diagnosed with 
leprosy, the leper became a social excommunicate. Not only was he unwelcomed by his peers, 
but his interaction with society was legally enjoined by the use of a leprozo amorendo, an 
ancient writ whose function was to permit forcible removal of a leper who "thrust himself into 
the company of his neighbors in any parish." Lepers lost their legal rights to devise, bequeath, 
contract, and inherit; these rights were abrogated by law upon contracting the disease. 
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY, VOL. II, 1929 (Rawle's Third Revision 1914); 1 F. POLLACK & 
F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 480-81 (2d 
ed. 1923). The onslaught of the Bubonic Plague in the mid-1300s inspired the English legis-
lature to enact strict quarantine statutes. One such statute, 1 Jac. I c.31, precluded any person 
infected with the plague from venturing out of his home. The strictness with which the English 
legislature enforced these laws is reflected in the penal sanctions for breach of quarantine. 
Anyone so quarantined who ventured from his home, even if "he hard] no plague upon him" 
was punished by whipping; anyone who broke quarantine who had "any infectious sore upon 
him uncured" suffered death as a felon - that is, without benefit of clergy. Thus, once any 
individual was classified as disease-ridden by health officials, regardless of whether he actually 
carried the disease, his individual right to liberty was subrogated to the public good until such 
time as the quarantine was lifted. Similar broad-based statutes were enacted to prevent the 
spread of Indian cholera in 1832 and to require mandatory vaccination of citizens against 
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degree of fear and intolerance. While purporting to exclude ill per-
sons for health and safety reasons, closer examination of late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century case law demonstrates that ex-
clusion was at least partially guided by a collective anathema for the 
diseased condition. 84 
The right to exclude the diseased has not always been subject to 
an objective standard of review exemplified by a balancing of relative 
harms. :for example, throughout the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, American courts upheld the common carrier's right 
to exclude sick or insane passengers.85 This right of exclusion osten-
sibly was based on a reasonable threat to the public health. As the 
District of Columbia Supreme Court enunciated in Lemont v. Wash-
ington & Georgetown R.R.,86 the common carrier's right to exclude 
a passenger was based on a duty to "maintain the peace and safety 
of the vehicles intact." Interestingly, the court simultaneously main-
tained that a safeguard against the abuse of such power limited its 
exercise only to situations "where it can be satisfactorily proved that 
the condition or conduct of a person is such as to render it reasonably 
certain that he would occasion discomfort or annoyance to other 
passengers if ... allowed to remain."87 The court's language dem-
onstrates that the objective criteria behind a justified expulsion 
decision based on the preservation of the "peace and safety of the 
vehicles," developed into a more subjective determination based on 
the "discomfort and annoyance" a diseased person created by his 
presence. 
In Pullman Co. v. Krauss,88 the plaintiff, who suffered from "sy-
philitic eczema," booked passage from Memphis to Birmingham. 
After the conductor received complaints from passengers that plain-
tiff had a "contagious and loathsome89 disease; that his hands and 
smallpox, after the vaccine was discovered in 1796. 3 H. STEVEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOL. 111,289-93 (1979 reprint of 1841 ed.). 
84 But see Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (California statute making status of narcotic addiction 
in the absence of the commission of an illegal act a criminal offense struck down under Eighth 
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); cf Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 
(1968)(criminal penalties may be imposed on chronic alcoholic where accused has behaved or 
committed an act which society has interest in preventing, i.e. public drunkenness). 
85 Paddock v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 37 F. 841 (1889); Pullman Co. v. Krauss, 145 Ala. 
395,40 So. 398 (1906); Conolly v. Crescent R. Co., 41 La.Ann. 57, 5 So. 259 (1888); Lemont 
v. Washington and Georgetown R.R. Co., 47 Amer. Rep. 238, 1 Mackey 180 (1881). 
86 Lerrwnt, 47 Amer.Rep. at 239. 
151 [d. 
88 145 Ala. 395, 40 So. 398 (1906). 
89 The import of the court's choice of the word loathsome to describe plaintiff's condition is 
highlighted by resort to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY. Loathsome is defined 
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arms were wrapped in cloth; and that there were eruptions upon a 
part of his body that were visible," plaintiff was refused passage on 
the train.90 The court found that syphilitic eczema was a contagious 
disease.91 In articulating the rule of law regarding exclusion of con-
tagious individuals, the court noted that the "right of a person to a 
berth or passage on a sleeping car is . . . subject to such reasonable 
regulation as . . . prescribed for the due accommodation of passen-
gers and for the safety and comfort of passengers."92 The court did 
not discuss the public health threat which the plaintiff's condition 
allegedly posed to passengers, but noted in dicta that: 
[s]leeping car companies are not bound to admit persons as pas-
sengers on its cars who are guilty of gross and vulgar habits or 
conduct, or who make disturbances on board, and, a fortiori, 
persons who are afflicted with contagious or infectious disease 
93 
That the court associated guilt, grossness, and vulgarity with the 
diseased is clear; that the court upheld the exclusion on the basis of 
a threat to passenger safety is not. The court quoted with approval: 
[T]he carrier of passengers . . . may refuse to accept persons 
offering themselves as passengers who are unfit to be carried 
either because such person . . . from bad character, from being 
afflicted by contagious disease, from apprehended evil designs 
. . . or from drunkenness or insanity, would be unfit associates 
for them or unsafe for the carrier. 94 
The absence of any discussion of the public health threats posed by 
the alleged contagiousness of the plaintiff's condition indicates that 
the court's decision was influenced partly by its subjective classifi-
cation of the diseased as "unfit associates." 
as: "Disgusting: a: offensive to the senses: Nauseating, Foul ... b: repulsive to sensibility or 
conscience: Odious, Abhorrent. WEBSTER'S 1326 (1981). 
!IO Pullman Co., 145 Ala. at 400, 40 So. at 400. 
91 "Syphilitic eczema" is not listed in STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICtiONARY (5TH ED. 1982), 
however, it does define syphilis as "an acute chronic, infectious disease . . . transmitted by 
direct contact, through sexual intercourse." [d. at 1399. It defines eczema as a "[g]eneric term 
for acute or chronic inflammatory conditions of the skin .... " [d. at 443. WEBSTER'S defines 
eczema as "an acute or chronic noncontagious inflammatory condition of the skin .... " Supra 
note 75, at 721 (emphasis added). Thus, because eczema, which is a symptom of syphilis, does 
not appear ever to be contagious, and syphilis is contagious only through sexual contact, it is 
not clear whether 1) syphilitic eczema is contagious at all or 2) whether it is contagious upon 
casual contact. The court did not discuss the basis for its statement. 
WI. [d. 
93 Pullman Co., 145 Ala. at 400,40 So. at 400. 
IN [d., quoting HUTCHINSON ON CARRIERS § 540 (2d ed. n.p. n.d.). 
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N or was the right to passage the only individual right of the 
diseased abridged in the interest of public health. In 1905, the Su-
preme Court of Errors of Connecticut upheld against an equal pro-
tection attack a Connecticut statute forbidding the marriage of epi-
leptics. 95 The goal of the statute was to prevent the congenital 
perpetuation of the disease by preventing female epileptics from 
bearing children. 96 The court justified the constitutionality of the law 
by noting that; 
[t]o impose such a restriction ... is no invasion of the equality 
of all men before the law, if it applies to all, under the same 
circumstances, who belong to a certain class of persons, which 
class can reasonably be regarded as one requiring special legis-
lation either for their protection or for the protection from them 
of the community at large. 97 
While the Gould court adopted a somewhat patronizing and 
indiscriminate98 attitude toward epileptics, unlike the court in Pull-
man Co., it did reflect on the public health threat connected with 
the perpetuation of epilepsy: 
[the law] cannot be pronounced by the judiciary to be intrinsically 
unreasonable if it should be regarded as a determination by the 
General Assembly that a law of this kind is necessary for the 
preservation of the public health . . . The class of persons to 
whom the statute applies is not one arbitrarily formed to suit its 
purpose. It is certain and definite. It is a class capable of endan-
gering the health of families and adding greatly to the sum of 
human suffering. 99 
95 Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 61 A. 604 (1905). Pub. Acts 1895 c. 325, § 1: "No man or 
woman, either of whom is epileptic, imbecile, or feeble-minded, shall intermarry, or live 
together as husband and wife, when the woman is under forty-five years of age. Any person 
violating or attempting to violate any of the provisions of this section shall be imprisoned in 
the state prison not less than three years." 78 Conn. at 243, 61 A. at 604. By 1905, four other 
states had enacted similar statutes: Michigan, Minnesota, Kansas and Ohio. 78 Conn. at 245, 
61 A. at 605. 
96 78 Conn. at 242-43, 61 A. at 604-05. 
97 [d. 
98 78 Conn. at 242, 61 A. at 604. The court was indiscriminate in that it lumped epileptics 
with "imbeciles" and the "feeble-minded." It was patronizing in assuming that epileptics were 
incapable of making such individual decisions for themselves. While epilepsy is a disease of 
the brain involving neurological problems causing convulsions, it does not have intellectual 
manifestations impacting the capacity to make rational decisions regarding self-protection. 
See generally STEDMAN'S, supra note 92, at 473-74, WEBSTER'S, supra note 75, at 763. 
Furthermore, epilepsy is not always genetically based; it may be caused by an "organic lesion 
of the brain produced by tumor, injury, toxic agents, or glandular disturbances." WEBSTER'S, 
supra note 75, at 763. 
99 Gould, 78 Conn. at 245, 61 A. at 605. 
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The court nonetheless indulged in a subjective characterization of 
epilepsy as "a disease of a peculiarly serious and revolting charac-
ter."100 Again, the court's words implied that the noxiousness of the 
disease was rooted in the public's forced observance of it. 
Similarly, the impact of disease on others was cited as a basis for 
excluding a child from the Wisconsin public schools. In 1919, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Beattie v. Board of Education of the 
City of Antigo101 held that an academically capable cerebral palsied 
child, who was slow in speech and unable to control his facial con-
tortions and drooling, could be excluded from the public school sys-
tem because "his physical condition and ailment produce[d] a de-
pressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school 
children. "102 The school board's determination could not be abrogated 
by the judiciary, the court held, unless the school board had acted 
"illegally or unreasonably."103 The court held that "[t]he right of a 
child of school age to attend the public schools of this state cannot 
be insisted upon when its presence therein is harmful to the best 
interests of the school."l04 The court's subjective approach broadened 
the school board's exclusionary powers; "depressing" or "nauseating" 
conditions sufficient to justify exclusion could not be standardized, 
hence, the resulting rule of law was difficult to apply consistently. 
The right of a diseased child to attend public school was thus found 
to be dependent upon the school board's absolute discretion. 105 
The Beattie decision may have been the product of a less enlight-
ened era to which modern courts would not fall prey. In actuality, 
the same problem would not arise because the AIDS child, unlike a 
cerebral palsied child, would in most cases not exhibit any physical 
manifestations which a school board could find "depressing" or "nau-
seating." The fact remains, however, that AIDS is a disease that 
engenders great fear and which often evokes suspicion of lifestyles 
that may be unacceptable to some persons. This intolerance could 
motivate exclusionary treatment of persons with AIDS that might 
not result from cases involving a less controversial disease. In the 
absence of a statutory scheme, the judicial precedent behind the 
treatment of diseased persons becomes acutely important, especially 
100 78 Conn. at 244, 61 A. at 604. 
101 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919). 
102 169 Wis. at 232, 172 N.W. at 154. 
103 169 Wis. at 233..,34, 172 N.W. at 155. 
104 169 Wis. at 233..,34, 172 N.W. at 155. 
105 Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under the Education For All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975, 58 Wash. U.L.Q. 213, 216 (1980). 
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where the right to an equal education is at stake. The following 
sections examine the claim of a Constitutional right to education as 
well as the judicial deference accorded to local control of the public 
school systems. 
B. The Right to Education Under the Constitution 
Education is one of the most essential values of American soci-
ety.106 That education for all youth is of paramount importance is 
reflected in both the expenditures made in United States schools and 
in state compulsory attendance laws. 107 The United States Supreme 
Court has stated that "education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments,"l08 yet it also declared that 
education is not a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution.109 The state of the law regarding the right 
to education is largely the result of two cases: Brown v. Board of 
Education110 and San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez. ll1 These 
two cases shed light on the modern Court's view of the legal status 
of the right to education and provide a framework for analysis of the 
AIDS child's right to education under the equal protection and due 
process clauses. 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis applies when-
ever the state treats an identifiable group differently from another. 112 
In determining the existence of a Constitutional violation, the Court 
has developed two basic standards, "strict scrutiny" and "rational 
basis." If the interest affected is a "fundamental right," or if the 
group allegedly deprived of a right is deemed to be "suspect," then 
the Court will strictly scrutinize the law or policy.113 Under this 
standard of review, the government has a more stringent burden of 
proof in sustaining the law and must show that the law is justified 
by a compelling state interest. 114 This burden is rarely, if ever, 
106 SoRGEN, KAPLIN, DUFFY & MARGOLIN, STATE, ScHOOL AND FAMILY, at vi (2d ed. 
1979). 
107 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 76, § 1 (West 1982). 
108 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
109 San Antonio School District, 411 U.S. at 35. 
110 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
111 411 U.S. 1 (1972). 
112 See generally Roos, The Potential Impact of Rodriguez on Other School Reform Liti-
gation, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 566, 567 (1974); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 12,416-24 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter NOWAK]. 
113Id. 
114 Id. 
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met. 115 Fundamental rights recognized by the Court include the right 
to vote,116 the right to interstate travel,117 the right to marry,118 and 
the right to marital privacy and procreation. 119 Suspect classifications 
include racial groups,120 aliens,121 and groups of different national 
origin. 122 
If the state action complained of neither infringes on a fundamental 
interest, nor operates on a suspect class, then the state, in meeting 
its burden of proof, need only show that the practice is "rationally 
related" to a legitimate state interest,123 which is a more lenient 
standard. 
Similarly, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process anal-
ysis, which requires the Court to review independently the legiti-
macy of a law or policy, operates only when the law or policy affects 
fundamental rights.124 If the Court finds that the case involves a 
fundamental right, it applies the same strict scrutiny standard of 
review applied in its equal protection analysis. If no fundamental 
right is involved, the Court will not exercise independent review, as 
long as the law or policy is rationally related to a legitimate state 
goa1. 125 From the plaintiff's point of view, strict scrutiny is thus the 
more desirable standard of review in the AIDS exclusion context 
since a school board exclusion policy will have difficulty meeting the 
higher standard of review where the CDC guidelines present a less 
restrictive alternative. Strict scrutiny is, however, also the more 
unlikely standard of review because the Court has declined to include 
education within the limited class of fundamental rights. 
In Brown v. Board of Education,126 the Court held that, once a 
state undertook to provide educational opportunities, it must make 
115 [d. 
116 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 
621, 626 (1969). 
117 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,229, 237-S38 (1970); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 
745, 757~9 (1966). 
118 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
119 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
100 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
121 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
122 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948). 
123 Roos, supra note 112, at 567. 
124 NOWAK, supra note 112, at 416-24. 
125 [d. 
126 347 U.S. at 483. The Supreme Court struck down "separate but equal" discriminatory 
educational facilities for racial groups as a violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The case involved the consolidation of class actions originating in 
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those opportunities "available to all on equal terms. "127 In reaching 
its holding, the Court reflected on the "intangible" aspects of edu-
cation that it found vital to the formation of individuals: 
[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it 
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural val-
ues, in preparing him for later professional training, and in help-
ing him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it 
is doubtful that any child may be reasonably expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education . . . . To 
separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as 
to their status in the community that will affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 128 
The Brown decision required equal educational opportunities by 
focusing on the importance of education and the psychological impli-
cation of segregation. In Brown, race was recognized by the Court 
as a suspect class. 129 The Court did not reach the issue of whether 
education was a fundamental right implicitly guaranteed by the Con-
stitution. 
In 1973, the Court held in San Antonio School District v. 
Rodriguez130 that education was not a fundamental right explicitly 
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 131 Since it was not a 
fundamental right, under equal protection analysis, the Texas edu-
cational funding law was not subject to strict judicial scrutiny but 
four states in which minor Negro plaintiffs sought admission to public schools on a non-
segregated basis. 
127 I d. at 493. 
128 Id. at 493-94. 
129 Id. at 493. 
130 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In Rodriguez, the plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of school 
children residing in "poor" school districts with a low property tax base. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs 
claimed that the Texas educational funding scheme based on local property tax bases favored 
the affluent and resulted in substantial interdistrict disparities in per-pupil expenditures due 
to the disparity in property values among the districts, thereby offending equal protection 
notions. Id. 
The Court held that district property wealth was not a suspect classification for equal 
protection purposes where education in some form was provided, id. at 18, and distinguished 
the instant case from Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)(state law preventing indigent 
criminal from acquiring transcript of trial for appeal process struck down as violative of 
fundamental right), Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)(indigent defendants guaranteed 
right to counsel on direct appeal), and Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)(Texas filing fee 
requirements for candidates in primary elections disallowed where there was an absolute 
deprivation of a right). 
131 411 U.S. at 35. 
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rather to the rational basis test. The Texas scheme thus survived 
judicial review. 132 
The holdings in Brown and Rodriguez as applied to the excluded 
AIDS child are of limited utility. The right to education is not a 
fundamental right under Rodriguez, nor has the Court recognized 
children with AIDS or any type of disease as a suspect class for 
purposes of strict scrutiny equal protection analysis. 133 The strict 
scrutiny standard of review is therefore inapplicable, and a school 
board's policy of exclusion would be assessed according to the ra-
tional basis test. While educational segregation based on any kind 
of definable group characteristic could engender the feelings of in-
feriority that the Brown court found impermissible, strict scrutiny 
is never applied in the absence of a recognized suspect class. 
Similarly, because no fundamental right is at issue, strict scrutiny 
cannot be invoked under a substantive due process theory. Under 
the lower standard of review, school boards would have little diffi-
culty in proving that a policy of exclusion was rationally related to 
the legitimate state interest in preventing the spread of AIDS in 
the schools. 
N or would a nexus argument linking the right to free speech or 
the right to vote with education be any more successful in the AIDS 
context than it was in Rodriguez. 134 The nexus argument in Rodri-
guez was rejected because the children in Texas received "adequate" 
education and were not completely deprived of all educational op-
portunity.135 As school districts that have excluded AIDS children 
provide alternative educational methods,136 in separate classrooms 
or through audio-visual aids137 which may be deemed "adequate," it 
is unlikely that the equal protection nexus argument would succeed 
132 Id. at 55. 
133 Nor have homosexuality or handicaps been held to be suspect classifications by the 
Supreme Court. 
134 Although the Court noted the strong nexus between education and First Amendment 
rights and fundamental interests such as free speech and the vote, it did not find a serious 
undermining of those rights where Texas was providing an adequate education which did not 
result in an absolute denial of educational opportunity. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. Where, 
however, a state plan completely deprives an individual of educational opportunity, it will not 
survive the rational basis test. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1981)(Texas statute 
excluding children of undocumented workers from local schools held not rationally related to 
legitimate state interest). 
135 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. 
136 In Washington, a child with AIDS excluded from the classroom with his peers is tutored 
alone in a separate classroom in the school. Thomas, supra note 58, at 25. 
137 In Kokomo, Indiana, Ryan White received instruction at home through a telephone 
hookup mechanism. I d. 
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in establishing education in the public school classroom as a funda-
mental right. Under an equal protection and/or due process rational 
relation standard of review, an attorney representing an AIDS child 
faces a heavy burden to prove the unreasonableness of such a policy, 
especially where the risk is not certain, the effects are deadly and 
the cure is nonexistent. 
C. The Power to Exclude Children From School 
In addition to the lower standard of review inherent in equal 
protection and due process analysis, an advocate representing an 
AIDS child must also face the considerable obstacle posed by judicial 
deference to state and local control over schools. Management of the 
public school systemsl38 and police power regulation for the general 
health and welfare of the communityl39 are bastions of local control 
with which courts will rarely interfere unless there exists a flagrant 
abuse of discretion. 140 
The seminal case on state authority to regulate in the contagious 
disease context is Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 141 In 1904, the first 
Justice Harlan wrote that, "[u]pon the principle of self defense, a 
community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of 
disease which threatens the safety of its members."I42 In Jacobson, 
the Court held that a compulsory smallpox vaccination law did not 
contravene the personal liberties secured by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. l43 Vaccination was presumed to prevent smallpox, thus the 
law was held to be a reasonable restriction in the interest of public 
138 See, e.g., Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass 475,476 (1870); Bd. of Educ. v. Goldman, 47 
Ohio App. 417, 424, 191 N.E. 914, 916-17 (1934). 
139 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133,140 (1893); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co. 
115 U.S. 650, 661 (1885); Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877); Railroad Co. v. 
Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470-71 (1877). 
140 See, e.g., San Antonio Sclwol District, 411 U.S. at 42-43 ("educational policy ... [is an] 
area in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against 
premature interference with the informed judgements made at the state and local levels 
.... [T]he judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible consti-
tutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimen-
tation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast 
of ever-changing conditions."); Kirk, 83 S.C. at 380, 65 S.E. at 390, ("[T]he courts cannot 
invade the province of the legislative govermnent. . . . In all judicial inquiry with respect to 
health laws and regulations, every intendment is to be allowed in favor of the validity of the 
statute"). 
141 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
142' [d. at 27. 
143 See id. at 35. 
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safety. 144 As a result, states enacted statutes excluding unvaccinated 
children from the public schools as a public health measure. 145 
The police power is not without limitation; to be valid, a state's 
exclusion must pass the traditional rational basis test. If the power 
is exercised in circumstances where there is no actual health threat, 
if exercised with regard to particular persons in an arbitrary, un-
reasonable manner, or is unduly restrictive, the courts must inter-
vene to protect the individual rights at risk. 146 
In addition to the state's general police power authority to regulate 
in the contagious disease context, states are explicitly charged with 
the management of the public schools. 147 Specifically, many state 
statutes delegate to local school boards the express authority to 
exclude any child infected with a contagious disease who poses a 
danger to public health. l48 To the public mind, AIDS is a deadly, 
contagious disease which threatens to be the next public health 
epidemic. Requesting a court to allow an excluded AIDS child to 
attend school thus requires judicial abrogation of the express au-
thority conferred by the legislature on the school boards, which is a 
clear departure from a major tenet of judicial review, deference to 
144 Id. 
145 See Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (l900)(compulsory vaccination law requiring 
exclusion of unvaccinated pupils from public schools held valid). See also Allen v. Ingalls, 182 
Ark. 991, 33 S.W.2d 1099 (1930); Anderson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 259, 65 S.E.2d 848 (1951); 
Hartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934); Sadlock v. Bd. of Educ., 137 N.J. Law 
85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948); In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d 143 (N.Y.Fam. Ct. 1944); State v. 
Barberton Board of Education, 76 Ohio St. 297, 81 N.E. 568 (1907). 
146 197 U.S. at 28. See also Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 226-28 (l904)(gasworks 
ordinance excluding plant in process of construction based upon no change in neighborhood or 
conditions held void as arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of police power); Jew Ho v. 
Williamson, 103 F. 10, 23 (l900)(quarantine regulation voided as violation of equal protection 
where it was enforced only against Chinese residents and other races within its limits); Wong 
Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1,7 (l900)(San Francisco board of health restrained from inoculating 
only Chinese residents with bubonic plague serum where action had no reasonable relation to 
protection of public health); Eddy v. Bd. of Health, 10 Phila. 94 (Phila. Ct. C.P. 1873)(eviction 
of tenants and closing up of houses held unlawful where there was no actual existence of 
contagious disease); Kirk, 83 S.C. at 379, 65 S.E. at 390 (board of health restrained from 
committing to unsanitary pest house individual who suffered from only slightly contagious 
form of leprosy). 
147 Goldman, 47 Ohio App. at 422-24, 191 N.E. at 916-17; Hodgkins, 105 Mass. at 475--76. 
148 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 71, § 55 (West 1982). See also Duffield v. Wil-
liamsport School Dist., 162 Pa. 476, 483-84, 29 A. 742, 743 (1894)(city school board has 
authority to adopt reasonable health regulations for the benefit of the pupils and the general 
public); In re Carroll Tp. School Dist., 15 Pa. D. 711, 712, 31 Pa. Co. 573, (C.P. Cambria 
County 1905)(statute granting power to school directors to prevent introduction and spread 
of contagious diseases in the schools is not subject to judicial review if the power is reasonably 
exercised). 
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the legislature. In light of such deference, the rationality of such 
statutes will almost always immunize them from challenge. 
In summary, neither Fourteenth Amendment equal protection nor 
due process theories provide a strong legal basis for attacking AIDS 
school exclusion policies where the rationality of a statute is the 
standard of review. Deference to the legislative and the judicially 
recognized state authority to regulate in the contagious disease con-
text militates against a court's finding a school board exclusion policy 
irrational. Where the epidemiology of the disease is uncertain, where 
fear and controversy surround the disease, and where the theoretical 
effect of error could be fatal, it is unlikely that a court will carve out 
protections for these children. The following section of this article 
outlines a possible statutory resolution of these issues. The substan-
tive and procedural protections afforded handicapped children under 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act are discussed. The 
section suggests that AIDS may be classified as a handicap under 
EAHCA.149 In conclusion, the section compares the utility of pro-
ceeding under EAHCA with the utility of proceeding under the 
Rehabilitation Act. 
IV. THE EFFICACY OF PROCEEDING UNDER EAHCA 
A. Handicapped Rights to Education Pursuant to EAHCA 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, educational needs of hand-
icapped children had so increased that states were unable to meet 
their statutory obligations in the absence of concentrated federal 
aid. 150 Motivated by the decisions in P ARC151 and Mills,152 the two 
cases that established a handicapped child's right to equal educa-
14. See infra notes 184-212 and accompanying text. 
160 121 CONGo REC. 25,540 (1975). Ten years earlier, Congress had already begun enlarging 
the federal government's involvement in the assurance of equal educational opportunity for 
the handicapped. Congress' initial allocation of federal funds to educational programs for 
handicapped children occurred in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. 
L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27, legislation focused primarily on the economically disadvantaged. 
The following year, Congress amended the Act to include an independent title specifically 
aimed at providing funding for educational opportunities for the handicapped, Pub. L. No. 89 
750, 80 Stat. 1191 (1966), marking the first federal recognition of the educational disadvantages 
of handicapped children as a group. 
161 Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, (PARC), 343 F. Supp. 279 
(E.D. Pa. 1972). 
162 Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of the District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
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tional opportunity,153 Congress enacted Public Law 94-142, the Ed-
ucation for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. 154 EAHCA allo-
cates federal money to each state that makes a bona fide effort to 
provide equal education to the handicapped. 155 Congress found that, 
out of the more than eight million handicapped children in the United 
States, four million of those children did not receive appropriate 
educational services "that would enable them to have full equality 
of opportunity. "156 Moreover, at least one million children were "ex-
cluded entirely from the public school system and [would] not go 
through the educational process with their peers. "157 Acknowledging 
the needs of handicapped children as well as the inadequate state 
resources to meet those needs, Congress pledged federal assistance 
153 The court in P ARC explicitly overruled the traditional assumption that mentally retarded 
persons were incapable of benefiting from a program of education and training, and required 
free public education for all mentally retarded children. Among the alternative programs 
available, placement in a regular school class with appropriate ancillary services was preferable 
to placement elsewhere. 343 F. Supp. at 307. Mills, the companion case to PARC, held that 
the due process clause required all handicapped children to be provided with a free, publicly 
supported educational program suited to their needs. 348 F. Supp. at 878. The adopted consent 
decrees included a full panoply of procedural safeguards to prevent arbitrary mental retar-
dation labeling and denial of access to public education. The courts in both cases relied on the 
parties' consent decrees. 343 F. SUpp. at 303; 348 F. Supp. at 880-81. After PARC and Mills, 
numerous commentators reflected on the constitutional basis of the right of the handicapped 
to public school education. For a thorough discussion of potential due process and equal 
protection arguments on this point, see Large, supra note 105, at 218; Krass, The Right to 
Public Ecucationfor Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 LAW F. 
1016, 1023-42 (1976); Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional 
Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (1972); Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, 
Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CALIF. 
L. REV. 40 (1974); Schwartz, The Education of Handicapped Children: Emerging Legal 
Doctrines, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 125 (1973); Weintraub & Abdson, Appropriate Education 
for All Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037 (1972); Yudof, 
Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1973); Comment, The 
Right to Education for Mentally Retarded Children, 43 UMKC L. REV. 79, 81-96 (1974); 
Note, The Right of Handicapped Children to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 519 (1974); Comment, Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education 
of the Mentally Retarded, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 554 (1973); Comment, Public Instruction to the 
Learning Disabled: Higher Hurdles for the Handicapped, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 113 (1973). See 
also In Interest ofG.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974)(strict scrutiny equal protection analysis 
applies to physically handicapped person as physical handicap is an immutable characteristic 
of birth). For evidence of congressional recognition of P ARC and Mills during debate over 
the EAHCA see e.g., 121 CONGo REC. 19,485 (1975). 
154 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982 & Supp. 1985). The Act was originally introduced in 
Congress on May 16, 1972 and was signed into law by President Ford on December 2, 1975. 
See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 796 (1975). 
155 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
156Id. § 1400(b)(1),(3),(4). 
157Id. 
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to state and local efforts to address the needs of handicapped children 
"in order to assure equal protection of the law."I58 In enacting 
EAHCA, Congress explicitly recognized that the equal protection 
clause guaranteed a free, appropriate public education to handi-
capped children,159 and integrated the protections of that clause into 
the statute. 160 The right of any child covered by EAHCA to a free 
public school education thus receives the combined protections of a 
federal statute and the Constitution. 
As its name implies, EAHCA protects a broad spectrum of hand-
icapped children. EAHCA defines handicapped children as "mentally 
retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech or language impaired, visu-
ally handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically im-
paired, or other health impaired children, or children with specific 
learning disabilities who by reason thereof require special education 
and related services" (emphasis added).161 The Act covers children 
between the ages of five and eighteen and encourages pre-school 
educational programs as well as instruction up to age twenty-one if 
not inconsistent with state law. 162 All such children are entitled to 
"specially designed instruction at no cost to parents or guardians to 
meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom 
instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction and 
158 [d. § 1401(b)(5)-(9). 
159 Congress' commitment to meet the educational needs of handicapped children under 
§ 1401(b)(9) in order to assure "equal protection of the law" has been interpreted by some 
commentators as an "acceptance of the argument that a right to free public education exists 
under the equal protection clause." See Krass, supra note 153, at 1064. In as much as this 
statement mirrors the general mandates of Brown v. Board of Education that once a state 
undertakes to provide an opportunity for public education, it must make that opportunity 
available to all on equal terms, this is an accurate proposition; whether a "right" to free public 
education exists (i.e. a fundamental right or interest) under the equal protection clause or the 
Constitution in general is dubious after Rodriguez. See supra notes 106---37 and accompanying 
text. But see 121 CONG.REC. 25,534 (1975)(statement of Rep. Brademas, "free public education 
... is a right that is theirs [handicapped children's] under the Constitution); 121 CONGo REc. 
19,504 (1975) (statement of Sen. Schweiker, "[handicapped] children ... are being denied 
services which are guaranteed under the Constitution). 
160 Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions of the equal protection clause by 
appropriate legislation under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. 
CONST., amend. XIV, § 5. See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 643, 648 (1966). 
In Katzenbach, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, limited the scope of congressional 
power under the enforcement clause to the adoption of measures to promote fourteenth 
amendment guarantees. Better known as the "Ratchet Argument," Congress has only the 
power to enforce or enlarge protections but not to dilute, abrogate or restrict such guarantees. 
384 U.S. at 651, n. 10. 
161 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(I) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
162 [d. § 1412(2)(B). 
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instruction in hospitals and institutions,l63 as well as related services 
such as transportation and psychological services. 164 
The focal point of EAHCA is its funding mechanism. l65 In order 
to be eligiblel66 for federal funds under EAHCA, a state must fulfill 
several conditions. First, a state must implement a policy assuring 
equal education for handicapped children and must submit a plan of 
compliance to the Secretary of Education. This plan must detail the 
procedures the state has or will adopt, which includes both time-
tables for implementation and identification procedures, as well as 
notice requirements to parents, guardians and the general public for 
any amendment to the plan prior to submission. 167 
Second, EAHCA's eligibility provisions require states to establish 
priorities for providing educational services first to those handi-
capped children who currently do not receive public educational 
services. l68 Next, the state must offer special assistance to severely 
handicapped children who have received an inadequate education. 169 
Most importantly, the state must establish procedures to assure that, 
to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children in-
cluding children in public or private care facilities, are educated 
with children who are not handicapped, and that special classes, 
separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children 
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the 
nature of severity of the handicap is such that education in 
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services 
cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 170 
163 Id. § 1401(16). 
164 Id. § 1401(17). 
166 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) provides that the purpose of EAHCA is: 
to assure that all handicapped children have available to them, within the time periods 
specified in section 1412(2)(B) of this title, a free appropriate public education which 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique 
needs, to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians 
are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all 
handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate 
handicapped children. 
For cases interpreting the purposes of EAHCA, see Rabinowitz v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 
550 F. Supp. 481 (D.N.J. 1982); Lang v. Braintree School Comm., 545 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Mass. 
1982); Gladys I. v. Pearland Ind. School District, 520 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Tex. 1981). 
166 20 U.S.C. at § 1412 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
167Id. § 1412(1),(2)(A),(C),(E). 
168 Id. § 1412(3). 
169 Id. 
17°Id. § 1412(5). See Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 52 
(N.D.Ala. 1981)(removal of 18 year old boy from regular classroom educational placement 
struck down as his mental retardation did not interfere with satisfactory regular class edu-
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This provision reflects the modern goal of "mainstreaming,"171 or 
integration of the handicapped with the non-handicapped. The pri-
macy placed on mainstreaming as a prerequisite for funding under 
the Act is particularly useful to the AIDS child. 
While much of EAHCA focuses on special education and special 
services, the mainstreaming provision requires placement in the 
regular classroom environment172 and is thus the dispositive statu-
tory provision in the AIDS context. The CDC and state department 
of public health guidelines are designed to mitigate any theoretical 
risk of AIDS transmission through casual contact, consequently the 
severity of the risk of contagion by permitting an AIDS child in the 
classroom is not "such that education in regular classes with the use 
of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfacto-
rily." The CDC guidelines are, by analogy, a "supplementary aid or 
service" under EAHCA which make possible the concurrent educa-
tion of the AIDS child with his peers. 
EAHCA requires the state to establish procedural safeguards 
which enable the handicapped child and his parents to participate in 
each child's individualized education plan and to appeal any classifi-
cation or change of classification. 173 Such procedural rights include 
written prior notice of any proposed change in placement by the 
state or local educational agency, free access to the child's records, 
and an opportunity to present complaints. 174 Upon receipt of a com-
plaint, the parents or guardian of the handicapped child may have 
an impartial hearing before a neutral examiner175 during which each 
party has the right to be represented by counsel and experts. 176 The 
parties may subpoena, confront, and cross-examine witnesses. 177 Fi-
nally, the reviewing officer is required to provide the parties with a 
written transcript or electronic tape recording of the hearing, and 
cation); cf Johnston by Johnston v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 569 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D.Mich. 
1983)(nature and severity of cerebral palsied child's handicap precluded satisfactory education 
in the regular school environment even with the use of supplementary aids and services). 
171 For commentary criticizing the preeminence of total mainstreaming, see Large, supra 
note 105, at 244-54. 
172 For an analysis of the § 1412(5) mainstreaming provision, see Comment, The Least 
Restrictive Environment Section of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975: 
A Legislative History and an Analysis, 13 GoNZ. L. REV. 717, passim (1978). 
173 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5),(7), 1415 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
174 [d. § 1415(b)(1). 
175 [d. § 1415(b)(2). 
176 [d. § 1415(d)(1). The provision does not disclose whether "the right to be accompanied 
and advised by counsel" will be provided at public expense should the party be unable to 
afford such counsel. 
177 [d. § 1415(d)(2). 
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must issue written findings of fact and decision as a basis for any 
subsequent appeal. 178 
EAHCA provides an extensive appeal process. Aggrieved parties 
may appeal decisions rendered by a local educational agency to the 
state educational agency review officer who must then make an 
independent decision based on his review of the facts. 179 Following 
review by the state agency, a party may bring a civil action in state 
court or in federal district court; EAHCA provides for federal juris-
diction without regard to the amount in controversy. 180 
EAHCA is a major step in ensuring that all handicapped children 
receive a comprehensive public education. Its provisions are partic-
ularly helpful in the AIDS context. In addition to an affirmative 
mandate for equal educational opportunities in the regular school 
classroom, EAHCA provides for specially designed instruction for 
the applicable students. It also provides for instruction in hospitals, 
a therapeutic service for the AIDS child whose immune status pre-
vents his attendance in public school under the CDC guidelines. 
EAHCA reduces the cost to states of instituting individualized ed-
ucation programs; a school board thus may not argue that cost 
considerations preclude implementation of the CDC guidelines. Since 
EAHCA requires that children remain in the educational placement 
during the pendency of the appeal, the child's education is not dis-
rupted. 181 Likewise, the provision precludes a school board from 
achieving the exclusionary result by a delayed appeal process. 182 
Finally, EAHCA frees the excluded AIDS child from expensive and 
178Id. § 1415(d)(3),(4). 
179Id. § 1415(c). 
180 Id. § 1415(e)(2), (4). The court's powers of review are a composite of de novo review and 
review of the administrative record. The de novo review power conferred on the court under 
the Act is somewhat obfuscated, however, by the apparent "stamp of finality" given to the 
ultimate decision by the state administrative body. See § 1415(e)(I) of EAHCA which indicates 
that "[aJ decision made in a hearing conducted pursuant to ... this section shall be final .... " 
The court then determines the appropriate relief based on the preponderance of the evi-
dence. Id. § 1415(e)(2). Under this hybrid standard, it seems clear that a handicapped child 
would have to prove that the state agency's decision was based upon insufficient evidence or 
that it violated procedural due process in order to surmount the deference generally accorded 
such administrative findings. Krass, supra note 153, at 1069. 
In order to protect the interests of the child during the pendency of the litigation or 
administrative review process, EAHCA directs that the child remain in his current educational 
placement. If the child applies for initial admission to the school, the child must be admitted, 
subject to parental consent, to the school until all proceedings are completed. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(e)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1985). The purpose of this provision is to provide the child with 
the educational placement he is seeking during the often lengthy review procedure. 
181Id. § 1415(e)(3). 
182 See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text. 
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lengthy litigation by providing this direct and cost-free administra-
tive appeal process. 183 It is a logical and efficient means of handling 
the education of children with AIDS. 
B. EAHCA Applied to the AIDS Child 
The preceding discussion illustrates the comprehensive, remedial 
nature of EAHCA's regulatory scheme. l84 Its elaborate procedural 
framework safeguards the handicapped child's rights to the maxi-
mum extent possible in an area where the regulatory power of the 
school board is broad and entitled to considerable deference. To 
benefit from EAHCA's protections, the AIDS child and his advocate 
must establish that acquired immune deficiency syndrome is a hand-
icap, and that a child afflicted with AIDS comes within the purview 
of EAHCA. Such an application is not axiomatic. Analysis of the 
common law reflects an absence of cases interpreting EAHCA with 
regard to illness or communicable diseases. While the statute's def-
inition of handicapped children neither affirmatively includes nor 
excludes children with communicable diseases, handicaps and dis-
abilities are not usually perceived to be contagious. This section 
examines the language of the statute as well as the federal regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to it by the Department of Education. 
As stated earlier, in the AIDS context, the relevant language from 
the laundry list of disabilities covered under EAHCA's definition of 
handicapped children is "other health impaired children. "185 The ap-
plicability of the statute's protection thus depends on whether AIDS 
constitutes a health impairment. AIDS arguably constitutes a hand-
icap under EAHCA. AIDS is a health impairment that affects the 
essential healthy function of the immune system by frustrating its 
ability to fight infection. AIDS consequently fits within EAHCA's 
definition of "handicapped." 
Though the simplicity of this argument is attractive, the statute 
does not specifically list infectious, communicable diseases; with the 
exception of "seriously emotionally disturbed," the conditions listed 
are noncommunicable disabilities, all of which are more commonly 
thought of as handicaps. The legislative history of F~AHCA does not 
183 Id. 
184 S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 1981)("[EAHCA], as [a] remedial statute, 
should be broadly applied and liberally construed in favor of providing a free and appropriate 
education to handicapped students"); Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D.Tex. 
1981)("EAHCA is a remedial statute and should be broadly applied and liberally construed"). 
185 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
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address what conditions are covered by the term "other health im-
pairments," but it consistently expresses an intent to provide equal 
educational opportunity to all children having unique educational 
needs. 186 
The interpretive regulations promulgated by the Office of Special 
Education and Rehabilitative Services of the Department of Edu-
cation (DOE), the agency entrusted with enforcement of the statute, 
are instructive as to the meaning of the term "other health impaired 
children." The DOE regulations define "other health impaired chil-
dren" as: 
(i) having an autistic condition which is manifested by severe 
communication and other developmental and educational prob-
186 See, e.g., 121 CONGo REe. 25,536 (1975)(statement of Rep. Fenwick): "I think all of us 
approved a widening of the number of handicaps covered under the legislation. We included 
. . . the perceptually handicapped child who is often overlooked and not recognized as being 
in need of help." 
Resort to the legislative history of EAHCA does not provide a definitive answer on whether 
Congress envisioned that contagious diseases would be covered by the Act. The legislative 
history of the term "other health impaired children" is convoluted and short. While an abun-
dance of material exists with regard to the funding mechanisms and procedural framework of 
the Act, Congress did not explicitly debate what conditions were contemplated as "other 
health impairments" when it enacted EAHCA in 1975. Instead, Congress carried over the 
language from Public Law 91-230, the Elementary, Secondary, and Other Educational Amend-
ments of 1970 (ESEA), a piece of legislation which consolidated into one act a number of 
previously separate federal grant authorities relating to handicapped children. The legislative 
history of Public Law 91-230 indicates that "the definitions for the act ... are taken from 
section 801 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 [Pub. L. No. 89-10] and 
from various statutes relating to the education of the handicapped." 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 2768, 2833. The language "other health impaired children" does appear in the 
amendments to that Act, 1966 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1392, 1408, 3844, 3898, but 
the legislative history does not discuss how or why the language was used. 
Public Law 88-164, the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers 
Construction Act of 1963 (MRF), Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963); 20 U.S.C. §§ 611-
618 , repealed by Pub. L. No. 91-230, title VI, § 662(2),(4), 84 Stat. 188 (1970), is one of the 
"various statutes relating to the education of the handicapped" in which the language "other 
health impaired children" first appears. The MRF amended the Public Health Service Act, 
Pub. L. No. 85-926, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300(z)(1O) (1958), to provide assistance in combatting 
mental retardation through grants for construction of research centers and to improve mental 
health through grants for construction of community mental health centers. Title III was 
adopted to extend and expand the program "to include the training of teachers of other 
handicapped children." 1963 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1054,1055. In lieu of "mentally 
retarded children," the amended language extended appropriations to teachers of "mentally 
retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally 
disturbed, crippled, or other health impaired children who by reason thereof require special 
education .... " Id. at 323(emphasis added). The legislative history discusses the needs of 
"handicapped children" and includes within its definition of that group "children who are blind, 
partially blind, deaf, hard of hearing, speech impaired, crippled, emotionally disturbed, men-
tally retarded, and children who have special health problems." Id. at 1068 (emphasis added). 
The language is maintained consistently in EAHCA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
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lems; or (ii) having limited strength, vitality or alertness, due to 
chronic or acute health problems such as a heart condition, tu-
berculosis, rheumatic [sic] fever, nephritis, asthma, sickle cell 
anemia, hemophilia, epilepsy, lead poisoning, leukemia or dia-
betes, which adversely affects a child's educational perfor-
mance. 187 
Clause (i) provides only that autism is a health impairment, and 
is therefore not instrumental to the AIDS analysis. Clause (ii), on 
the other hand, lists specific conditions that qualify as "other health 
impairments." This regulation is significant for four reasons. First, 
it is noteworthy that AIDS is a health problem known to sap 
strength, vitality and alertness. Second, the regulation adds that 
the health problem must "adversely affect[s] a child's educational 
performance." The debilitating and degenerative effects of AIDS 
clearly adversely affect a child's strength and vitality and thus his 
educational performance. For the child diagnosed as an AIDS car-
rier, the psychological stigma of the disease combined with the social 
ostracism practiced against individuals with AIDS adversely affects 
his educational performance. This effect is exacerbated if he is ex-
cluded from the classroom. Third, the regulation lists specific phys-
ical diseases and ailments, thus expanding the generic handicap/ 
disability definition listed in EAHCA. Fourth and most importantly, 
not only does the provision contemplate congenital and acquired 
diseases, but it specifically lists tuberculosis as a health impairment 
subject to the protections of the Act. 188 
Legislative intent that tuberculosis is a handicap covered by the 
statute lends crucial support to the similar classification of AIDS as 
a handicap under EAHCA. Tuberculosis, like AIDS, is a commun-
icable, infectious disease characterized by toxic symptoms such as 
fever, night sweats, and loss of weight. 189 The leading mode of trans-
mission in humans is through inhalation of airborne particles con-
taining tubercle bacilli expelled by an individual when he coughs, 
sneezes or talks. 190 
187 34 C.F.R. § 300.5(b)(7)(1985). 
188 Id. 
189 See W.W. STEAD, M.D., FUNDAMENTALS OF TUBERCULOSIS TODAY 11 (1973); J.S. 
MYERS, PH.D., AN ORIENTATION TO CHRONIC DISEASES AND DISABILITY 89 (1965); E.M. 
LINCOLN, M.D., & E.M. SEWELL, M.D., TUBERCULOSIS IN CHILDREN 284-85 (1963); H.W. 
HETHERINGTON, M.D. & F.W. ESHLEMAN, R.N., B.S., NURSING IN PREVENTION AND CON-
TROL OF TUBERCULOSIS 145-46 (1950). 
190 STEAD, supra note 189, at 6; LINCOLN & SEWELL, supra note 189, at 18; HETHERINGTON 
& ESHLEMAN, supra note 189, at 221-24. 
1986] OPENING THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR 617 
AIDS, like tuberculosis, should be considered a health impairment 
under EAHCA's definition of handicap. Both diseases pose a de 
minimis risk of contagion,191 impair major life functions by sapping 
strength and vitality,192 adversely affect a child's educational perfor-
mance, and stigmatize a child so as to damage his psychological 
development. 193 That the DOE regulations specifically contemplated 
tuberculosis, a contagious disease,194 is compelling evidence that 
AIDS also qualifies for the Act's general protections. 195 The list of 
191 See supra notes 22-58 and accompanying text; see supra notes 189-90 and accompanying 
text; see infra notes 268-79 and accompanying text. 
1921d. 
193 On the stigma associated with tuberculosis, see, e.g., LINCOLN & SEWELL, supra note 
189, at 15 ("[Ilt is important from a psychologic point of view that the stigma of contagion 
should be removed from children with asymptomatic nonprogressive pulmonary primary 
tuberculosis, both for the sake of the child and his family. "); MYERS, supra note 189, at 91 
("Perhaps equally severe a complication is the development of the stigma of being contami-
nated. This is felt by both the patient and the public .... "). On the stigma associated with 
AIDS, see discussion supra note 6. 
194 An argument could be made that the DOE's inclusion of tuberculosis within the definition 
of health impaired in § 300.5(b)(7) did not refer to contagious chronic tuberculosis but rather 
to the after-effects of the disease once put in remission, such as respiratory or ambulatory 
difficulties. However, in § 300.5(b)(6), in its definition of "orthopedically impaired" children, 
the DOE included "impairments caused by disease (e.g. poliomyelitis, bone tuberculosis, etc.)." 
This separate provision dealing with the after-effects of viral, infectious diseases supports the 
conclusion that the DOE was referring to chronic tuberculosis in its definition of health 
impairment handicaps in § 300.5(b)(7). 
195 EAHCA was revised in 1985 and the DOE regulations were likewise revised in July of 
1985, yet AIDS was not specifically added in either revision. The argument could be made 
that the absence of AIDS as a listed health impairment is a conspicuous sign that Congress 
did not want to include AIDS in the classification, especially in light of the fact that in July 
of 1985 over 12,000 cases of AIDS had been reported to the CDC. Education, supra note 6, 
at 517. The omission of AIDS in the 1985 revision of the DOE regulations might seem 
dispositive of the issue were it not for § 300.6 which specifies as follows: 
As used in this part, the term 'include' means that the items named are not all of the 
possible items that are covered, whether like or unlike the ones named. 34 C.F.R. 
§ 300.6 (1985). 
This section indicates that the DOE did not intend the conditions it listed to be exhaustive. 
Though the word "include" does not appear prior to the § 300.5(b)(7) list of health conditions 
under "other health impaired," the words "such as" do appear. The word "include" is used 
within the definitional listing section four times in the affirmative ("includes") and four times 
in the negative ("does not include"); that the DOE chose the words "such as" in lieu of 
"include" for a ninth time is neither surprising from a syntactical standpoint nor dispositive 
from a substantive one. "Such as" arguably has the same legislative intent behind it as 
"include" as an antecedent to a list of conditions comprehended within a given definition; its 
very definition suggests "something similar to or of the same type" in contrast to a limitation 
only to a specific enumeration of listed items. WEBSTER'S, supra note 75, at 2283. Rather, 
the general concept behind § 300.6 suggests that the DOE, in promulgating its regulations, 
had purposely not limited the protections of EAHCA only to the conditions mentioned, but 
implicitly extended the Act's aid to all children vlith impairments demanding "special education 
and related services." 34 C.F.R. § 300.6 (1985). 
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conditions within the definition of "handicapped" and "other health 
impaired" as carried over through legislation indicates that Congress 
did not intend to limit EAHCA's coverage to commonplace handi-
caps; it consistently included the broad provisions "other health 
impairments"196 to provide for those children not covered by specific 
and readily identifiable disabilities. The rulemakers' specific inclusion 
of tuberculosis in the list of conditions covered by the statute is 
concrete evidence that AIDS also should be presumed to be a hand-
icap under EAHCA. 
Although thus far few cases involving AIDS school children have 
yet been argued in court, the United States District Court for the 
District of Indiana relied on EAHCA's procedural requirements 
when confronted with an AIDS child's challenge to his exclusion 
from the regular classroom. In White v. Western School Corp., 197 the 
plaintiff, a thirteen year old hemophiliac who contracted AIDS 
through a blood transfusion, filed suit in the federal court in 
Indianapolis198 when the superintendent and school board refused to 
readmit him because he had the disease. The plaintiff sought injunc-
tive relief and brought claims under the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the United States Constitution, the Civil Rights 
Act,199 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,200 and the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act201. He argued that hemophilia - and 
AIDS - were handicaps under the statute. 202 The court denied the 
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction for failure to exhaust 
available administrative remedies and granted the school board's 
motion to stay the proceeding until the administrative process was 
exhausted. 203 
In arriving at its decision, the court made four interesting rulings. 
First, relying on the recent Supreme Court case Smith v. Robin-
son,204 the court held that "if EAHCA is available to the handicapped 
196 See Pub. L. No. 98-199 § 10 (1983); Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 602 (1966); Pub. L. No. 88-
164, § 301(3) (1963). 
197 White, No. IP-85-1192-C, slip op. at 1. 
198 Complaint, supra note 62, at 1. 
199 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 
200 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). 
201 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
202 Complaint, supra note 62, at 6. 
203 White, No. IP-85-1192-C, slip op. at 4. 
204 104 S. Ct. 3457(1984). Smith, discussed infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text, 
explicitly addressed the overlap of the EAHCA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the equal pro-
tection clause. For additional cases discussing this overlap, see Georgia Assoc. of Retarded 
Children v. McDaniel, 740 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1984); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577 (D.R.I. 
1982); Aken v. Bolton, 531 F. Supp. 300 (D. Ran. 1981). 
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child, then it is 'the exclusive avenue through which the child and 
his parents or guardian can pursue their claim."'~05 Second, the court 
found that EAHCA required a plaintiff to exhaust all state admin-
istrative remedies before seeking review by a court, and that the 
court in the instant case was thereby precluded from rendering 
judgment. Third, given the facts presented, the court held that there 
was no indication that the state administrative process was inher-
ently biased or that pursuit of such remedy would be futile. 206 
Fourth, the court sought to avoid the duplication of evidence and 
expense occasioned by two different fact finding bodies ruling on the 
same question and reiterated that the needs of handicapped children 
with regard to educational placement were best resolved at the local 
level. 207 
While the court did not explicitly hold that AIDS was a handicap 
under EAHCA, it did apply EAHCA to White, the plaintiff in West-
ern School COrp.208 That the court was silent with regard to the 
plaintiff's five other claims indicates the court's implicit acceptance 
of the argument that AIDS is a handicap, that EAHCA is therefore 
applicable, and that it is the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The court's 
preference for resolving the case under EAHCA indicates the su-
periority of proceeding under a statute that encourages local deter-
mination of the child's placement before resort to the courts. The 
court's decision to stay the judicial proceeding pending administra-
tive resolution of the dispute was correct. 
White's case has not yet been resolved. Nearly six months later, 
White was readmitted to classes by local authorities after a county 
medical officer acting on behalf of the Indiana Board of Special 
Education Appeals ruled that he posed no health threat to his fellow 
classmates. 209 While perhaps not the speediest nor even the most 
205 White, No. IP-85-1192-C, slip op. at 3., quoting Smith, 104 S. Ct. at 3470. 
206 An exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies rule occurs when resort to 
such state procedure would be futile. See, e.g., Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110, 112 
(D. Conn. 1979); Christopher T. by Brogna v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 553 F. Supp. 
1107, 1115 (N.D.Cal. 1982); Harris v. Campbell, 472 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D.Va. 1979); Doe v. 
Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 227-29 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Jose P. v. Ambuch, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 
1982); Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, afi'd in part, vacated in part, 645 F.2d 865 
(8th Cir. 1981), on remand 530 F. Supp. 295; Davis v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 522 F. 
Supp. 1102, 1107, reh'g denied, 530 F. Supp. 1209 (D.D.C. 1981). 
,,",7 White, No. IP-85-1192-C, slip op. at 5-6. 
208 [d. 
209 At White's hearing before the Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals, the panel 
ordered Western Middle School to request a health certificate from Dr. Alan J. Adler, chief 
medical officer for Howard County, and to admit White contingent on Dr. Adler's recommen-
dation. Dr. Adler performed a regular physical examination of White, but "looked more into 
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conclusive resolution of the matter in this particular case,210 the 
court's decision to force the plaintiff to utilize EAHCA's administra-
tive apparatus established the process for handling future claims. 
The court's application of EAHCA in the AIDS context and potential 
successful result accompanying it suggests that EAHCA may be 
invoked successfully by future plaintiffs. 
While classification of AIDS as a handicap under EAHCA does 
not in and of itself ensure that every AIDS child may attend public 
school in the regular classroom, it does establish the right to a free 
appropriate education for all children with AIDS. Once that right 
attaches under EAHCA, it cannot arbitrarily be altered or taken 
away.211 The applicability of the Act is limited to those handicaps 
where education'in regular classes with the use of supplementary 
aids and services can be achieved satisfactorily. Whether the AIDS 
child poses a risk to other students, and whether implementation of 
the CDC guidelines mitigate such risk so that concurrent education 
of the AIDS child could be satisfactorily achieved, are fact-specific 
issues that courts are obligated to scrutinize. Classification of AIDS 
under EAHCA would impose on the courts and future local admin-
istrative bodies an affirmative duty to make a "well-informed judg-
ment grounded in a careful and open-minded weighing of the risks 
and alternatives,"212 in contrast with the subjective approach em-
ployed in past cases involving diseased persons. The next section 
compares the Rehabilitation Act to EAHCA and discusses the ben-
efits of asserting that AIDS is a handicap under EAHCA. 
C. EAHCA Versus the Rehabilitation Act 
In contrast to EAHCA, the Rehabilitation Act213 (Section 504) is 
a broad civil rights law that proscribes discrimination against any 
how Ryan was emotionally and how it would be for him to go back to school," underlining the 
significant psychological difficulties children with AIDS face in today's unaccepting climate. 
School officials have stated they will hold county health officials responsible for any liability. 
Adler has stated that he is "willing to take that responsibility." N. Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1986, 
at A12, col. 2. 
210 Whether White may continue to attend school with his peers is still being debated at 
this writing. While White returned to school on February 21, 1986, by the end of the school 
day, Howard County Circuit Court Judge R. Alan Brubaker held, on a motion for preliminary 
injunction brought by three of White's classmates, that a 1949 state law covering communicable 
diseases might apply to White's case. Judge Brubaker again barred White from class until he 
could hold a hearing on whether the state law covers AIDS as a communicable disease. 1 APL 
7 (Feb. 26, 1986). 
211 See discussion of procedural safeguards, supra notes 173-183 and accompanying text. 
212 Arline, 772 F.2d at 765. 
213 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). 
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handicapped individual by any federally funded entity. The Act pro-
vides in pertinent part: 
[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United 
States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by 
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance 
214 
Notably, the statute does not on its face impose specific require-
ments for the educational context. In its regulatory framework, 
however, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare215 spec-
ified that public schools must provide a free, appropriate public 
education to each qualified handicapped person in their jurisdiction 
or, if necessary, must make available a private residential placement 
providing such an appropriate education. 216 In addition, the regula-
tions require the recipient to place the handicapped child in a regular 
classroom to the maximum extent possible, and to implement pro-
cedural safeguards, including notice, an opportunity to review rec-
ords, an impartial hearing allowing parental participation and coun-
sel, and a review procedure. 217 In sum, the statutory language bans 
discrimination on the basis of handicap, but it does not provide 
affirmative measures to prevent such discrimination. The specific 
provisions regarding the Rehabilitation Act's applicability to the 
education of handicapped children are regulatory rather than sta-
tutory. 
While the Rehabilitation Act perhaps establishes the right of hand-
icapped persons not to be discriminated against in the school context, 
it fails to provide the remedy. In its regulatory framework, the Act 
presumes substantive and procedural safeguards; it does not affir-
matively require them. 
The inadequacy of the Rehabilitation Act's protection was dem-
onstrated by the June 1986 Department of Justice (DOJ) ruling on 
214 [d. 
215 The regulations to the Rehabilitation Act were promulgated by the Secretary of HEW. 
42 Fed.Reg. 22676 (1977). HEW's functions under the Act were transferred in 1979 to the 
Secretary of Education under the Department of Education Organization Act, § 301(a), 93 
Stat. 677, 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a) (1979). 
216 34 C.F.R. ,§ 104.33(a),(c) (1985). 
217 [d. § 104.36. HEW declined to require the exact procedures set out in EAHCA because 
those procedures might be inappropriate for some recipients not subject to EAHCA. [d. 
§ 104.61. However, the agency indicated that compliance with EAHCA procedures would 
satisfy the regulation. [d. § 104.36. 
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the application of section 504 to persons with AIDS.218 Applying 
abstruse logic, the DOJ concluded that the disabling effects of AIDS 
constituted a handicap under section 504,219 but that discrimination 
on the basis of the communicability of AIDS was insufficient to 
qualify as a handicapping condition under the statute.220 According 
to the DOJ, an individual with AIDS may be handicapped under the 
Rehabilitation Act but his exclusion due to fear that he will spread 
the disease is not protected under the same statute. 221 The DOJ 
further limited the Act's protections by stating that plaintiffs under 
section 504 may not 
challenge the reasonableness of the defendant's judgment about 
the risk that he will spread the disease; defendants are not 
prohibited by section 504 from making incorrect, and even irra-
tional, decisions so long as their decisions are not based on 
handicap. 222 
The DOJ's weighty, though not binding, interpretation of section 
504's applicability to persons with AIDS thus mandates that the 
statute applies to AIDS patients only where discrimination is based 
on the disabling physical effects of AIDS on its host, but not where 
it is based on a concern about contagion. The DOJ cemented the 
artificiality of the distinction by finding that "there is no a priori 
reason to presume that assertions of fear of contagion are especially 
likely to be pretextual. "223 This interpretation of section 504 invites 
state and local bodies to deny protection to persons with AIDS 
without similarly requiring them to justify the rationality of their 
decision. The opinion makes patently obvious the Rehabilitation 
Act's inability to safeguard substantively or procedurally the rights 
of children with AIDS to attend public school. 
On the other hand, EAHCA statutorily provides for the right of 
a handicapped child to be educated with his peers to the maximum 
extent appropriate, as well as the right to remain in the desired 
educational setting. The omission of these two requirements could 
motivate abuse by school boards should the Rehabilitation Act re-
main the sole legislative protection applicable to AIDS-infected chil-
dren. Under the Rehabilitation Act, in the absence of EAHCA's 
218 DOJ Opin., supra note 33, at D-l. 
219 [d. at D-7. 
220 [d. at D-8, D-9 ("communicability alone - whether present or past and whether real or 
merely perceived - is not a handicap"). 
221 [d. at D-IO. 
222 [d. 
223 [d. at D-12. 
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mainstreaming provision, a school board is only barred from discrim-
inating on the basis of handicap; the provision of equal or superior 
public school education in separate classrooms for AIDS children or 
exclusion based on a fear of contagion would thus not violate the 
statute. Without EAHCA's affirmative mandate requiring an ex-
cluded AIDS child to be placed in the regular classroom during his 
appeal process, a school board could successfully bar the child's 
attendance for many months or until such time that 1) the child's 
disease progressed to the stage where the CDC guidelines pros-
cribed his attendance, or 2) the child died. In addition, if EAHCA 
and its administrative process were deemed inapplicable to AIDS, a 
section 504 claim224 would make it less likely that these disputes 
would be disposed of on the local level, which is a costly alternative 
for the AIDS child, as well as a direct undermining of congressional 
intent under EAHCA. 
Under the Rehabilitation Act, a handicapped individual is defined 
as: 
. . . any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major 
life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is 
regarded as having such impairment. 225 
This definition is significantly broader than the definition of handicap 
under EAHCA. The Rehabilitation Act regulations define "physical 
or mental impairment" to mean: 
(A) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following 
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense or-
gans; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; re-
productive, digestive,'genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; 
and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such 
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or 
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 226 
224 Whether § 504 even carries with it a private right of action is in doubt. Smith v. 
Cumberland School Comm., 703 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 
3457 (1984). Several federal circuit courts have implied such a right, e.g., Adashunas v. Negley, 
626 F.2d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 1980); United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342 
(1980); Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 538-39 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 
(1979); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296,299 (2d Cir. 1977). Recent U.S. Supreme Court 
dicta suggests that no private right of action exists. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27 (1981). 
225 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). 
22ti 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i)(1985). 
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AIDS falls within this regulatory definition because the HTLV-IIII 
LA V virus destroys lymphocytes in the blood, and thus constitutes 
a physiological disorder affecting the hemic and lymphatic systems. 
The regulations further define the phrase "has a record of such an 
impairment" as having a history of physical impairment.227 HEW 
directs that the phrase "is regarded as having an impairment" applies 
to all individuals who have an impairment which may not actually 
limit a life activity but which is treated as a handicap by society. 228 
These regulations neatly encompass AIDS carriers and AIDS chil-
dren in remission. Excluded school children who are carriers, though 
they are not in the acute stage of the disease, are even treated as 
having an impairment. Excluded children in remission have a "his-
tory of" physical impairment. 
While AIDS satisfies the statutory doonitions of handicapped un-
der section 504, it is not entirely clear that Congress or HEW 
intended these general definitions to apply to children with AIDS in 
the school context. 229 In a separate paragraph, section 104.3(k)(2), 
HEW specified that in the school context, a handicapped individual 
who qualifies for relief under section 504 is one who qualifies for a 
free appropriate education under EAHCA.230 
HEW made a specific regulatory provision for the definition of a 
qualified handicapped person in the school context which is consonant 
with the definition specified in EAHCA's statutory framework. This 
reference by HEW indicates a presumption by the Rehabilitation 
Act's regulatory agency that EAHCA is either the dispositive stat-
227 [d. § 104.3(j)(2)(iii). 
(iii)"Has a record of such an impairment" means has a history of, or [having] been 
misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities. 
[d. See also DOJ Opin., supra note 33, at D-7. 
228 [d. § 104.3(j)(2)(iv). 
[d. 
(iv)"Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical or mental 
impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated 
by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of 
others toward such impairment; or (C) has none of the impairments defined in 
paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section but is treated by a recipient as having such an 
impairment. 
229 For discussion of Congressional intent behind § 504, see DOJ Opin., supra note 33, at 
D--13-D--16. 
230 With respect to public preschool, elementary, secondary or adult educational services, a 
"qualified handicapped person" means a handicapped person. . . (iii)to whom a state is required 
to provide a free appropriate public education under section 612 of the Education of the 
Handicapped Act [EAHCA]. 34 C.F.R. at § 104.3(k)(2) (1985). 
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ute in the education context, or that the two Acts are to be read 
conjunctively. 
Courts have indeed held that diseases may constitute handicaps 
under the Rehabilitation Act. In September 1985, the Eleventh 
Circuit held in Arline v. School Board of Nassau County231 that 
tuberculosis constituted a handicap for purposes of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973.232 The plaintiff, a teacher who was fired from her public 
elementary school job after several relapses of tuberculosis, con-
tended that her susceptibility to tuberculosis made her a handi-
capped individual within the terms of the Rehabilitation Act, and 
that the school board therefore violated the Act because it fired her 
even though she was "otherwise qualified if given reasonable accom-
modation."233 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that tuberculosis 
was a handicap under the statute in this case, but, more importantly, 
that contagious diseases as a whole could be covered by section 
504.234 
Unlike the DOE interpretive regulations under EAHCA, tuber-
culosis was not explicitly listed as a contemplated handicap in the 
language of either the Rehabilitation Act or its agency regulations. 
If tuberculosis is a handicap under section 504, it should also be 
considered a handicap under EAHCA. If EAHCA applies to tuber-
culosis, a contagious disease, it should similarly apply to AIDS.235 
231 772 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. granted, No. 85-1277 (April 21, 1986). 
232 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). 
233 Arline, 773 F.2d at 760-61. 
234 The Arline court noted that: 
[t]he language of these provisions [the Rehabilitation Act and 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)] 
in every respect supports a conclusion that persons with contagious diseases are 
within the coverage of section 504. As the record in this case makes clear, a person 
with tuberculosis is, when afflicted with the disease, one who 'has a physical or 
mental impairment which substantially limits ... major life activities, ... since the 
disease can significantly impair respiratory functions as well as other major body 
systems. Even when not directly affected by tuberculosis, Arline falls within the 
coverage of section 504 because she "has a record of such an impairment" . . . and 
"is regarded as having such an impairment" by her employer [citation ommitted]. 
[d. at 764. 
236 In the employment discrimination context, advocates are arguing that AIDS constitutes 
a handicap under state handicapped employment discrimination statutes as well as the Re-
habilitation Act. The fear generated by the outbreak of AIDS has caused employers to 
separate, suspend, or terminate individuals having or suspected of having AIDS, ostensibly 
in the interest of public health. See Comment, supra note 37, at 735 (relating that gay employee 
lost job when he took time off from work to go to the doctor because his employer knew he 
was gay, assumed he had AIDS, and fired him); Wallis, supra note 1, at 45 (discussing the 
case of Johnny Greene, a writer, who was fired from an editing job at McDermott International, 
Inc. after writing an article for PEOPLE magazine about his own suspected case of AIDS); 
Flaherty, supra note 3, at 1, citing Case v. County of Tulare, 111532 (Tulare County Superior 
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In finding that tuberculosis fit within the broad definition of handi-
cap, the Arline court noted that coverage of the disease as a handicap 
Court) (male hairdresser sued employer charging that he was dismissed because he was 
suspected of having AIDS). 
Individuals have filed suit in state and federal court, as well as with administrative agencies, 
though no case has been litigated to an appellate level in any jurisdiction. Leonard, supra 
note 16, at 683. In a number of these cases, advocates have argued that AIDS constitutes a 
handicap, requiring protection under handicap/disability discrimination statutes. 
Several state human rights commissions, administrative agencies enforcing statutes prohib-
iting discrimination against the handicapped or disabled, have made the threshold determi-
nation that persons with AIDS are protected under the state statutes and administrative 
regulations. [d.; cf DOJ Opin., supra note 33, at D-7 et seq; supra notes 235-41 and accom-
panying text. 
Specifically, the New York State Attorney General determined that AIDS was a handicap 
protected by New York Human Rights law and accordingly brought suit for damages and 
injunctive relief against the cooperative apartment board of directors that refused to renew 
the lease of a gay doctor who had treated AIDS patients on the premises. Although the doctor 
successfully settled for damages, attorneys fees and a new lease without going to trial, the 
trial judge, in an unpublished opinion, overruled a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim under the state statute, a tacit acceptance that AIDS is covered under the handicap 
discrimination law. Leonard, supra note 16, at 683 n.9, citing People v. 49 West 12 Tenants 
Corp., No. 43604/83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oct. 17, 1983); Telephone interview with Arthur S. 
Leonard, Assoc. Prof. of Law, N.Y. U. (Sept. 24, 1985). 
In Florida, the Commission on Human Relations found that AIDS fit the meaning of handicap 
under Florida law. The Commission then held that Broward County officials had acted illegally 
when they fired a budget analyst in September, 1984 after learning he had AIDS. Boston 
Globe, Dec. 14, 1985, at 9, col. 2. Unless the employer can show that the employee with AIDS 
is a threat to others, then such discrimination is unacceptable under Florida handicapped law. 
[d. 
Although the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits the federal government from discrimi-
nating against handicapped individuals who are otherwise qualified to perform their jobs, 
there is no national, comprehensive, regulatory prohibition of private sector discrimination. 
See, e.g., DOJ Opin., supra note 33, at D-7. The majority of states and the District of 
Columbia have responded to this void by enacting statutes which ban handicapped discrimi-
nation in the private and public sector. Compare ALA. CODE § 21-7-1 to 21-7-10 (1984), ARK. 
STAT. ANN. § 82-2901 (1985), IDAHO CODE §§ 56-701 to 57-707 (1984), MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-
6-1 to 43-6-105 (1981 & Supp. 1985), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-10,20-13-10.1 (1979 
& Supp. 1985) prohibiting discrimination of the handicapped only in the public sector, and 
Arizona, Delaware and Wyoming which have not spoken on the subject. Significantly, two 
states expressly exclude protection of individuals suffering from "communicable diseases." See 
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3(b)(2) (1982), Ky. REV. STAT. § 207.140 (2)(c) (1984), and one state 
excludes protection for disability by virtue of illness. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:3(XIII) (1985). While coverage of AIDS sufferers is arguable in the 47 states prohibiting 
discrimination against the handicapped, coverage in the latter three jurisdictions appears 
prohibited. 
The definitional language of "handicapped" contained in the federal Rehabilitation Act is 
repeated with minor variations in many of the state handicap employment discrimination laws. 
While statutory definitions of "handicapped" are generally broad in scope, they do vary and 
there is little or no case law interpreting the exact parameters of the term. Courts have found 
that diseases can constitute a handicap under the law. See, e.g., Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. 
Dep't of Indus. Labor & Human Relations, 14 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 344,345 (Wis. 
Cir. Ct. 1976)("Acute lymphocytic leukemia 'clearly constitutes a handicap' within the meaning 
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promoted congressional intent, and thus the court refused to exempt 
tuberculosis from coverage under section 504 without further legis-
lative direction. 236 , 
While the Arline court applied the Rehabilitation Act to tuber-
culosis, it declined to apply a specific remedy. The court noted that 
the scope of section 504 is to prevent arbitrary decision-making by 
state authorities that deprives genuinely qualified handicapped per-
sons from participating in federally funded programs.237 The court 
remanded to the lower court the question of whether the teacher 
posed too great a health risk to be otherwise accommodated. 238 
The court in District 27 Community School Board239 found that 
AIDS is a contagious disease that represents a handicap in the school 
context. This Queens, N ew York superior court case represents the 
only court decision to date to address explicitly the issues of exclu-
sion of AIDS children from public schools and whether AIDS may 
be considered a handicap under the federal laws protecting the hand-
icapped. The court in District 27 Community School Board held that 
children with AIDS are protected against exclusion by both the 
Rehabilitation Act and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 24o Although the court found that AIDS was a handicap 
of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act."); Chicago, M., St.P. & P.R. Co. v. State, Dept. of 
T.L. & H.R., 62 Wis.2d 392,398,215 N.W.2d 443,446 (1974)(asthma included within definition 
of handicap under Wisconsin Fair Employment Act). Few state legislatures have directly 
analyzed the role of infectious diseases under handicap discrimination law, and most which 
do, attempt to make clear that a protected physical impairment may be caused by an illness, 
as well as by an accident or congenital birth defect. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(13) 
(1984); CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 12926(h) (West 1980 & Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 46a-51(15) (West Supp. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1709(4) (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 5, § 4553 (7)(A) (West 1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.550(103(b) (Callaghan 1985); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 49-3-101(4) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-131 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10-5-
5(q) (West Supp. 1976 & Supp. 1985); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.003 (Vernon 1982 
& Supp. 1986). 
236 In reaching its decision, the Arline court stated: 
When a fact pattern falls so neatly within the statutory and regulatory framework, 
and when coverage would so clearly serve to promote Congress' intent to reduce 
instances of unthinking and unnecessary discrimination against those who are the 
focus of the statute's concern, we would be hard pressed to find an exemption without 
further legislative direction. 
772 F.2d at 764. 
For further discussion of the analogy of AIDS and tuberculosis as handicaps under the 
EAHCA and with regard to the risk of contagion, see infra notes 268-79 and accompanying 
text. 
237 Arline, 772 F.2d at 765. 
238 [d. 
239 Dist. 27 Community School Bd., No. 14949/85, slip op. at 55. 
240 Noting that public school education is not a fundamental right, the court found that the 
school boards' exclusion plan violated the fourteenth amendment in that it failed the Brown 
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under the Rehabilitation Act, it found that the syndrome was not a 
handicap under EAHCA. The court's classification of AIDS as a 
handicap under the Rehabilitation Act is an analytical stepping 
stone, but the utility of this holding is limited. Finding AIDS to be 
a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act is necessary but not suffi-
cient. The court reached the just result in District 27 Community 
School Board, but it failed to establish a systemic remedy to be 
applied by the local school boards who indisputedly retain the power 
to manage the public schools. By denying the applicability of 
EAHCA to AIDS,241 AIDS will not be treated as a handicap on the 
criteria of making the provided state benefit available to all on equal terms - the boards' 
plan called for excluding only known AIDS cases or carriers without imposing similar exclusion 
on ARC patients or asymptomatic carriers. The court thus found that the plan lacked a 
rational basis. [d. at 56--57. 
241 [d. at 66. The disposition of the EAHCA claim by the Queens court (Hyman, J.) is 
somewhat curious. In District 27, the school boards challenged the appropriateness of the 
City's referral of the AIDS children to a committee instituted by the Department of Health 
rather than to the local school districts' Committee on the Handicapped, established pursuant 
to the EAHCA and the N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4401(1). "The pivotal question," the court noted, 
"is whether a child diagnosed as having AIDS would fall within the definition of handicapped 
child." Dist. 27 Community School Bd., No. 14940/85, slip op. at 66. The court held that 
[d. 
while a child with AIDS could become handicapped as a result of deterioration in his 
or her condition, the evidence clearly supports the determination that such children 
are not handicapped for purposes of referral to a Committee on the Handicapped 
merely because they have AIDS/ARC or are infected with the HTLV-IIIILAV virus. 
The court's rather summary analysis perhaps explains the result. The court noted that 
EAHCA definition of handicapped was narrower than that of the Rehabilitation Act, but did 
not adequately explore the statutory definitions or the regulations. While many AIDS carriers 
do not continuously exhibit signs of "limited strength, alertness or vitality," neither do children 
with tuberculosis, epilepsy, or diabetes, diseases characterized by remission and relapse, 
which are all contemplated handicaps in the regulations. While agency regulations are not 
dispositive, they are entitled to considerable weight. St. Louis Dev. Dist. Treatment Center 
v. Mallory, 591 F. Supp. 1416, 1444 (W.D.Mo. 1984). The Queens court never addressed or 
distinguished AIDS from these diseases. 
Nor does the court adequately address the N ew York Education Law, promulgated under 
EAHCA, which defines a child with a handicapping condition as one "who, because of mental, 
physical or emotional reasons can receive appropriate educational opportunities from special 
services and programs .... " N. Y. Educ. Law § 4401(1)(1984). Given the court's own concern 
for confidentiality of AIDS diagnosis, Dist. 27 Community School Bd., No. 14940/85, slip op. 
at 77-79, and the fact that one of the four identified New York City school children with AIDS 
was removed from public school due to the potential psychological damage attendant to the 
disclosure of her illness, it is surprising that the court failed to find that an AIDS carrier 
could be handicapped due to mental or emotional impairment as a result of stigma. 
Furthermore, the court's suggestion that a child with AIDS must wait until his condition 
deteriorates to be entitled to the protections of EAHCA is untenable; this is precisely the 
time when an AIDS child in all likelihood should not be in school or when he would be barred 
from attendance by the CDC recommendations. Under this analysis, an essentially healthy 
AIDS child could theoretically be excluded at a time when concurrent education was possible 
because he was not covered by the EAHCA, and then as he became more ill, he could establish 
he was handicapped and begin his appeal process. If the child's condition was deteriorating, 
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local level on a regular basis. Since the AIDS child is not accorded 
the regular class placement under EAHCA, as are other handi-
capped children, he requires a different educational placement pro-
cess; essentially he remains "different" even under a handicapped 
classification. A finding that AIDS constituted a handicap under both 
statutes would have given teeth to the holding by making compliance 
with it a prerequisite for receiving any federal funds for a district's 
handicapped population. 242 
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the interplay 
between the Rehabilitation Act and EAHCA. In Smith v. Robin-
son,243 the Court held that, where EAHCA is available to the hand-
icapped child, it is the exclusive avenue through which the child may 
pursue his claim.244 The Court found that Congress intended that 
each child's educational needs be determined on the local level, and 
therefore that it enacted EAHCA replete with explicit procedural 
safeguards with a later right to judicial review once all administra-
tive remedies had been exhausted. 245 
he might not survive his appeal process, and the local school boards would have established 
a de facto exclusion. 
It is also not clear whether Judge Hyman meant to limit his holding that children with 
AIDS are not handicapped under EAHCA only "for purposes of referral to a Committee on 
the Handicapped" rather than a Public Health committee as opposed to a global rejection of 
the statute's applicability. If the former interpretion applies, this difficulty could be relieved 
by placing medical experts and public health officials on the Handicapped Committee to 
specifically review AIDS children's claims and still entitle them to EAHCA protections. In 
its concluding statement on the issue, the court noted that "to hold [that an AIDS child could 
be referred to a Committeee on the Handicapped] would be tantamount to publicly fostering 
the picture of such children as 'damaged goods.'" [d. at 66-67. The court's reasoning is 
obscured by its implication that all other handicapped children subject to the EAHCA are 
"damaged goods," a notion which explicitly runs counter to EAHCA's objective to unify all 
children as equals in the public educational process. 
242 EAHCA's funding to states is not so large an amount of money that a state would be 
fiscally crippled if it opted not to accept the funding. Such a move would, however, be political 
suicide, as it would cut off federal funding for all handicapped children in the state. The 
Massachusetts Department of Education estimates that EAHCA provides approximately $220 
per year per handicapped child in Massachusetts. Telephone interview with Sandra Moodey, 
Esq., Mass. Dep't. of Educ., Legal Office, Quincy, MA (Feb. 10, 1986). 
243 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984). 
244 [d. at 3468. 
245 The Court stated: 
[EAHCA] establishes an elaborate procedural mechanism to protect the rights of 
handicapped children. The procedures ... effect Congress' intent that each child's 
individual educational needs be worked out through a process that begins on the local 
level and includes ongoing parental involvement, detailed procedural safeguards, and 
a right to judicial review .... Congress did not intend to have the EHA scheme 
circumvented by resort to the more general provisions of § 1983. We reach the same 
conclusion regarding petitioner's § 504 claim. 
[d. at 3469, 3472. 
630 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 13:583 
The Court focused on the interrelationship between section 504 
and EAHCA with regard to the handicapped child's right to a pub-
licly financed education. The Court noted that section 504 does not 
require affirmative action on behalf of handicapped persons, but only 
the absence of discrimination. 246 By contrast EAHCA guarantees a 
right to a free appropriate education and imposes affirmative re-
quirements. 247 Significantly, the Court held that EAHCA controlled 
the handicapped child's claim in the education context. 248 
AIDS should be classified as a handicap under EAHCA in deter-
mining school exclusion cases. EAHCA specifically addresses the 
educational placement of handicapped children. Since the Court de-
clared that EAHCA is the sole avenue for pursuing the educational 
claims of handicapped children, and because AIDS has been classified 
as a handicap under section 504, EAHCA should be available to 
protect the rights of the AIDS child. 
V. JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF AIDS AS A HANDICAP UNDER 
EAHCA 
A. The Standard of Review for Administrative Bodies and Courts 
EAHCA recognizes that not every handicapped child can be ed-
ucated successfully in the public school systems with supplementary 
aids and services. The mainstreaming provision establishes a strong 
congressional preference for integrating handicapped and non-hand-
icapped children;249 however, integration is not an absolute require-
246 Id. at 3473. 
247 The Court's language is explicit: 
Section 504 and the EHA are different substantive statutes. While the EHA guar-
antees a right to a free appropriate public education, § 504 simply prevents discrim-
ination on the basis of handicap . . . . [A]lthough both statutes begin with an equal 
protection premise that handicapped children must be given access to public educa-
tion, it does not follow that the affirmative requirements imposed by the two statutes 
are the same. The significant difference between the two, as applied to special 
education claims, is that the substantive and procedural rights assumed to be guar-
anteed by both statutes are specifically required only by the EHA. 
Id. at 3472. 
248 In reaching this result, the Court explained that [EAHCA ensures] 
that equal access to a public education is not an empty guarantee, but offers some 
benefit to a handicapped child .... Even assuming that the reach of § 504 is coex-
tensive with that of the EHA, there is no doubt that the remedies, rights, and 
procedures Congress set out in the EHA are the ones it intended to apply to a 
handicapped child's claim to a free appropriate education. 
Id. at 3473. 
249 Hendrick Hudson Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181, n. 4 (1982); Roncker v. 
Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983); Mallory, 591 F. Supp. at 1444; Talladega City 
Rd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 54-55; Community High School Dist. 155 v. Denz, 124 Ill. 
App. 3d 129, 135-38, 463 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (1984). 
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ment where it would not result in the best educational placement 
for the child or it could not be successfully accomplished. 250 The 
statute does not require a free, appropriate education for handi-
capped children in the regular classroom environment where the 
"nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular 
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be 
achieved satisfactorily. "251 Where a handicapped child's integration 
is challenged, EAHCA requires a particularized inquiry that weighs 
the costs and benefits of an alternative private placement to deter-
mine if education in the regular classroom cannot be achieved sat-
isfactorily.252 
Just as EAHCA does not mandate that all handicapped children 
are categorically entitled to attend public school in the regular class-
room environment, neither should all children with contagious dis-
eases be so entitled. The severity of a particular child's disease, or 
the risk he poses to others, may render education of that child in 
the regular school environment unsatisfactory. Whether a child ex-
cluded for having a AIDS or any other contagious disease may 
successfully be classified as a handicapped child under EAHCA in-
volves a two-pronged inquiry. First, does the child's disease function 
as a handicap for purposes of safeguarding the child's right to equal 
educational opportunity consonant with the legislative intent of 
EAHCA? This first inquiry requires analysis of whether the disease 
impairs educational performance, the longevity of the disease, the 
degree of contagion and the modes of transmission in the school 
context. Only certain diseases will meet the first prong's require-
ments. However, these requirements will be met more readily in 
subsequent cases once a court determines that a particular disease 
constitutes a handicap under the statute. 
250 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181 n.4; Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063; St. Louis, 591 F. Supp. at 1443; 
Denz, 124.Ill. App. 3d at 135, 463 N.E. 2d at 1003. 
251 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B). 
252 St. Louis, 591 F. Supp. at 1440 ("Fundamental to the guarantee of a free appropriate 
education is a requirement that each handicapped child be considered as an individual . . . . 
This congressional recognition carried over into the requirements of the Education Act."). 
While the review process is unique to each child, the courts do not have an unlimited power 
of review to determine the adequacy of state educational policies. Congress vested primary 
responsibility for formulating the educational policy for handicapped children to the state and 
local educational agencies in cooperation with the child's parents. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3)(1982 
& Supp. 1985). In a proceeding conducted pursuant to § 1415(e)(2), a state must give due 
deference to the state administrative proceedings in reaching its decisions. Roncker, 700 F.2d 
at 1062. Once it determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of 
methodology are for resolution by the States. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208. However, the Act 
does not command unlimited deference to local determinations. See Talladega City Bd. of 
Educ., 518 F. Supp. at 53 n.9 (preponderance of evidence standard reflects congressional 
decision to accord greater role in the enforcement scheme to the federal courts). 
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The second inquiry queries whether the severity of the particular 
child's disease, or his own behavior patterns, increase the risk of 
transmission so as to prevent satisfactory education in the regular 
school environment, even with the use of supplementary services. 
This second prong will always require the court or administrative 
body to make a particularized case-by-case inquiry, objectively bal-
ancing both the specific child's physical condition and the effective-
ness of prophylactic measures against the costs of social isolation, 
stigmatization, and the child's right to attend public school. If the 
costs to the child are significant while supplementary measures min-
imize the risk of his disease spreading in school, courts could find 
that, on balance, concurrent education may be achieved satisfacto-
rily. If, however, the risks of contagion even with supplementary 
services outweigh the interests of the child, the child would not be 
entitled to the protections of section 1412(B)(5) under the Act. 
B. Models of Analysis 
In New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. 
Carey,253 the New York City Board of Education excluded forty-two 
mentally retarded children who were carriers of the hepatitis-B virus 
from special education programs in public school. 254 The Board stated 
that the presence of these children in the classroom increased the 
risk of transmission of hepatitis-B. The Board argued that the "suf-
ficient unhygienic personal behavior" exhibited by the mentally re-
tarded children255 increased the chapces of contagion. The federal 
court enjoined the Board's action and held that the risk of contagion 
of hepatitis-B was not substantial enough to justify the exclusion256 
in light of the prophylactic measures available. 257 
253 466 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979). 
254 466 F. Supp. at 481. 
255 Among the behavior listed, the Board noted the following: 1) mouthing of objects; 2) 
interpersonal hand to mouth contact; 3) scratching which drew blood; 4) drooling; 5) bleeding 
of the gums; 6) self-abuse drawing blood; 7) slobbering; 8) kissing; and 9) biting. 466 F. Supp. 
at 483-84. 
256 [d. at 486. The court also found that the Board violated the EAHCA. The fact that the 
EAHCA was applied to a case involving hepatitis B, an infectious, communicable disease, is 
negated somewhat by the fact that the plaintiff class was also mentally retarded, and would 
thus automatically fall under the protections of the Act. 
257 These prophylactic measures incorporated the suggested guidelines of both the Unitea 
States Public Health Service, Center for Disease Control and the Department of Health task 
force. The guidelines required students to be tested at appropriate intervals and classified 
them as carriers, immunes or susceptibles for "cohorting" purposes. Susceptibles were to take 
their meals separate from carriers, and schoolbuses were to be monitored to prevent hazardous 
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Characterizing the Board's action as an overreaction which "none 
of the medical experts countenance,"258 the court criticized the im-
plementation of such an exclusionary policy that resulted from "pa-
rental pressure, [and a] fear of pUblicity and lawsuits .... "259 These 
obstacles, real as they may be, cannot be allowed to vitiate the rights 
of these handicapped schoolchildren. 26o Integral to the court's deci-
sion was the traumatic effect and irreparable harm that the Board's 
policy would have on the children. 261 The court's decision rested on 
the absence of established causation. Presented with a situation in 
which medical evidence failed to demonstrate a causal relationship 
between the classroom setting and transmission of the virus, and 
where the threat to the public health was "purely theoretical,"262 the 
court held that the educational needs of the affected children out-
weighed the countervailing public interest. 263 
contact between the two groups. In addition, good personal hygiene was to be encouraged, 
sinks were to be made available in each classroom and unhygienic personal contact was to be 
discouraged. In sum, the control measures were largely based on magnified personal hygiene 
and caution in the handling of blood-contaminated items. 466 F. Supp. at 484. 
258 ld. at 485. 
259Id. 
260 ld. 
261 The court stated that: 
ld. 
[the Board'sl overreaction has caused and will continue to cause irreparable harm to 
the children involved . . . . The traumatic effect of being told at the last minute that 
they can no longer participate in the schools where many of them have already spent 
two or three years is extremely great. To this must be added that . . . many of the 
excluded children are simply remaining at home while their peers and co-residents 
go to school. However, the most serious consequences of the Board's plan would be 
felt if the pupils were sent to school in developmental centers. The Court is convinced 
that this would have a severely retrogressive effect on the development of these 
children .... 
262 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 487, 500 
(E.D.N.Y. 1979)(Motion for declaratory judgment) [hereinafter Carey Il]. 
263 466 F. Supp. at 485. A different result was reached by the United States District Court 
for the District of Maryland in a similar situation. In Ely v. Howard County Bd. of Educ., 
No. M81-3072 (D. Md. Jan. 11, 1982), reprinted in 3 EHLR 553:288 (Feb. 5, 1982), the parents 
of a mentally retarded student infected with hepatitis B sought an injunction to force the 
school to permit his attendance. Noting the hardship the plaintiff child would endure as a 
result of the forced separation from interaction with his peers, the court held that the 
probability that the child's saliva would reach the mucous membranes or open skin of either 
staff or other students, though minimal under proper hygienic precautions, was too great to 
permit the child's attendance in school. Certain factual mutations may have justified the 
different result: a member of the child's household "has or did contract Hepatitis B apparently 
from contact with [the childl, the majority of the school employees were female, three of 
whom were pregnant at the time, and the court relied heavily on the Gibbon study conclusion 
that saliva carries the virus. The court's summary discussion of prophylactic measures, and 
its complete substantive avoidance of the Carey decision, a case in point decided three year's 
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In a similar case, Community High School District 155 v. Denz,264 
an Illinois state appellate court affirmed the decision of the Illinois 
Superintendent of Education to mainstream a mentally handicapped 
child with Down's syndrome who was also a carrier of hepatitis B. 265 
Although Ingrid Denz was educationally qualified to attend a special 
public school facility, her school district excluded her because she 
was a carrier of hepatitis B. 266 She was then placed in a homebound 
educational program where she received her education through a 
tutor.267 The school district argued that the "inappropriate" behavior 
of the children in the special education school posed potential trans-
mission routes for the disease if the respondent were integrated. 268 
The court affirmed her placement in the public school facility in light 
of her "personal characteristics, the relatively low risk of transmis-
sion of the disease as testified to by the experts, and [the facility's] 
ability to fashion an individualized program for [the respondent] and 
the other students which could further reduce that risk. "269 As in 
Carey, the Denz court emphasized the importance of the socialization 
and peer interaction processes that occur among children in the 
regular classroom. 27o On balance, where the minimal risks of trans-
mission were mitigated by both prophylactic measures and the par-
ticular child's behavior patterns, the benefits of integration out-
weighed the risk of contagion. 
These cases stand for the proposition that contagious disease may 
be the basis for exclusion only if an adjudicatory body determines 
upon particularized analysis that the risk of infection, even when 
mitigated by prophylactic measures or individual behavior patterns, 
outweighs the costs to the child of such exclusion. This type of 
analysis prevents a global categorization of all diseased persons and 
allows a court to distinguish between different types of diseases and 
before by another federal court, is somewhat curious. Interestingly, Ely cited Carey for the 
proposition that the court had acted within its discretion to exercise subject matter jurisdiction 
over the request for interim relief. If nothing else, the court manifested its awareness of the 
Carey decision, which makes the absence of discussion even more conspicuous. "As to [the 
risk of transmissability l," the court noted, "there is no hard evidence. It is a matter of opinion, 
based on fact." In the face of the Carey precedent and the avoidance of distinguishing 
discussion, the court's opinion seems determined to favor its own result. See also In re Santa 
Clara Superintendent of Schools, 3 EHLR 503: 252 (1982). 
264 124 Ill. App. 3d at 129, 463 N.E.2d at 998 (1984). 
265 124 Ill. App. 3d at 140, 463 N.E.2d at 1005. 
266 124 Ill. App. 3d at 131, 463 N.E.2d at 1000. 
267Id. 
268 124 Ill. App. 3d at 136, 463 N.E.2d at 1003. 
269 124 Ill. App. 3d at 137--38, 463 N.E.2d at 1004. 
270 Id., quoting Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. W. Va. 1976). 
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their individual characteristics in order properly to assess which 
diseases are analagous to handicaps. 
The Carey and Denz courts' analysis of hepatitis B is especially 
germane to the AIDS context. The medical evidence regarding non-
communicability in the classroom setting, the availability of prophy-
lactic measures to guard against any theoretical risk, and the de-
generative effect of segregation on the infected children are the 
paradigmatic AIDS situation. Moreover, the Carey analysis should 
transfer more readily to the AIDS context, as AIDS children are 
less likely than mentally retarded children to engage in behavior 
conducive to transfer of the virus. 271 Since AIDS is more sensation-
alized and stigmatized by society than is hepatitis-B, courts' refusal 
to sanction exclusion based on parental pressure and fear is even 
more compelling. Combined with their reliance on statutes protect-
ing the handicapped, courts' objective analysis of the medical risk of 
transmission effectively protected these carrier children's right to 
be educated in public schools with their peers. 272 Similar analysis 
should be adopted in the AIDS cases. 
C. Characteristics of Diseases That Motivate a Handicap 
C lassijication 
Apart from the type of analytical approach a court or administra-
tive body should follow in determining whether a disease constitutes 
a handicap for purposes of EAHCA, the characteristics of the disease 
itself will determine whether such classification is justified. By listing 
271 Carey, 466 F. Supp. at 484. The court heard conflicting evidence on whether these 
children actually did exhibit behavior conducive to transfer of the virus. However, it is 
presumable that children of average to above average mental and emotional capacity are 
better capable of controlling physical behavior. 
272 The court found that the New York City Board of Education's plan violated the Reha-
bilitation Act, EAHCA and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The court 
rejected the theory that retarded children constituted a suspect class, but found that the 
Board's segregation plan was without rational basis under traditional equal protection analysis. 
Carey II, 466 F. Supp. at 504. 
Although the court also found that the Board had violated the Rehabilitation Act and 
EAHCA, the clarity of the holding is negated somewhat by the fact that the plaintiff class 
was also mentally retarded and would thus automatically fall under the protections of the Act. 
However, in Denz, the court was reviewing a similar fact pattern to that of Carey and indicated 
that the application of EAHCA could pertain to the child's diseased condition: 
[Rlegardless of whether its decision was based on a physical disease rather than 
Ingrid's handicap, it is ... clear ... that the school district's decision had the effect 
of infringing upon Ingrid's right to be mainstreamed under the EAHCA ... 
Denz, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 138, 463 N.E.2d at 1004. Arguably, the court viewed Ingrid's 
hepatitis B health impairment as a handicap under the EAHCA. 
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tuberculosis as a health impairment covered under its regulations, 
the DOE has already determined that tuberculosis qualifies as a 
handicap. Similarly, by allowing children with hepatitis B to attend 
public school, the Carey and Denz courts have found that hepatitis 
B would qualify as a handicap under EAHCA.273 Analysis of the 
characteristics of these diseases is useful in determining whether 
AIDS may be covered by EAHCA. 
Tuberculosis is an infectious disease that attacks the lungs and 
causes extreme tissue damage. Usually it is transmitted through 
inhalation of droplets of mucus or saliva that contain tubercle bacilli 
expelled by an adult with chronic tuberculosis when he coughs, 
sneezes or talks. 274 The droplets remain suspended in the air, float 
with air currents, and may infect others who are a distance away, 
even after an il1terval of one or two hours from the time the droplets 
were expelled. 275 Significantly, only tuberculous adults produce and 
disseminate large numbers of bacilli. 276 Almost all children who test 
positive for tuberculosis contract non-progressive pulmonary pri-
mary tuberculosis, the primary, phase of tuberculosis. 277 Primary 
tuberculosis is not contagious because it generally does not advance 
to the stage where it liquefies tissues; the majority of children with 
primary tuberculosis do not cough, do not produce sputum, and 
therefore do not expel bacteria into the atmosphere. 278 Primary tu-
berculosis in children is thus not considered contagious. 279 
273 See supra note 227. 
274 See supra note 190. 
275 HETHERINGTON & ESHLEMAN, supra note 190, at 221-22; STEAD, supra note 190, at 6. 
Tuberculosis may be spread person to person in ways other than inhalation of wet droplets 
through the air: 1) inhalation of dust containing tubercle bacilli originating from dried sputum 
droplets swept into the air by air currents; 2) swallowing of tubercle bacilli that have lodged 
on the lips or mucous membranes by kissing, contaminated eating or drinking facilities, or 
from contaminated hands of individuals who perform personal services for tuberculous pa-
tients; 3) inoculation of tubercle bacilli through a wound or through an error in technique. 
HETHERINGTON & ESHLEMAN, supra note 190, at 223-24. 
276 See STEAD, supra note 190, at 21; LINCOLN & SEWELL, supra note 190, at 14-15. 
277 [d. 
278 [d. Once the tubercle bacilli are inhaled, they begin to slowly multiply without eliciting 
any reaction. After several weeks, an allergy develops to the bacilli which produces an 
inflammatory reaction at the site of the infection. This allergy initiates the body's immune 
response. In primary tuberculosis, the immune system effectively controls the infection so 
that it causes no illness, produces no tubercle bacilli, and heals without diagnosis unless a 
tuberculin test is administered. This is the stage of tuberulosis must commonly found in 
children. As the infection heals, it leaves dormant lesions which can "reawaken" and develop 
into active tuberculosis in later life when body resistance is lowered. This is the chronic 
tuberculosis stage which is serious and contagious. Tubercle bacilli multiply rapidly, cause 
liquefication of tissue and in turn this contagious liquid is expelled in the environment. See 
generally id. 
279 STEAD, supra note 190, at 21; LINCOLN & SEWELL, supra note 190, at 14-15. 
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While medical authorities agree that non-progressive pulmonary 
primary tuberculosis in children poses "almost no danger" of conta-
gion,280 there remains a small risk that the bacteria could be spread 
into the atmosphere. 281 This can occur in the rare instance when a 
child develops chronic or "adult" tuberculosis, when tubercle bacilli 
are present in the bronchi of a child with primary pulmonary tuber-
culosis and he coughs or sneezes, or at a time when the primary 
tuberculosis diagnosed child is suffering from a severe upper respir-
atory or non-tubercular pulmonary infection.282 Since tuberculosis is 
a relapsing disease, it is technically incurable.283 The development 
and perfection of chemotherapy treatment, however, effectively 
keeps the disease in remission and has resulted in a 95% recovery 
rate for tuberculous patients. 284 In addition, the vaccination for tu-
berculosis has proven 80% effective in preventing infection and vir-
tually 100% effective in making the infections which it cannot prevent 
less virulent. 285 
Hepatitis B is a virus that has a devastating effect on the liver. It 
is characterized by fatigue, loss of appetite, nausea, jaundice, fever 
and inflammation of the liver and spleen. 286 Hepatitis B has a similar 
epidemiology to AIDS; it is transmitted parenterally by means of 
transfusions of infected blood products, by use of a contaminated 
needle, or through sexual intercourse which causes a break in a 
membrane.287 Hepatitis B, like AIDS, is a disease of limited com-
municability that does not pose a risk of contagion in the classroom. 
While medical authorities agree that sexual or blood contact is 
required for transmission of the virus, the hepatitis B antigen has 
been isolated in a number of body secretions, most notably saliva.288 
280 LINCOLN & SEWELL, supra note 190, at 15. See also STEAD, supra note 190, at 21. 
281 See id. 
282 [d. In the average laboratory, bacilli are recovered in approximately 25% of children 
with primary tuberculosis but such cultures generally contain a low concentration of the 
bacteria. LINCOLN & SEWELL, supra note 190, at 15. 
283 MYERS, supra note 190, at 86. 
284 STEAD, supra note 190, at 14. 
285 [d. at 22. 
286 MYERS, supra note 190, at 13. 
287 RAYMOND S. KOFF, M.D., VIRAL HEPATITIS (1978), passim.; MYERS, supra note 190, 
at 152--53; Carey, 466 F. Supp. at 483; Denz, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 136, 463 N.E.2d at 1003. 
288 KOFF, supra note 287, at 19. The hepatitis B virus (HBV) has been isolated with variable 
frequency and little consistency in the following body secretions: feces, urine, saliva, sneeze 
droplets, nasopharyngeal secretions, tears, anterior chamber eye fluid, sweat, semen, vaginal 
secretions, amniotic fluid, pleural effusions, gastric juice, bile, intestinal fluid, colostrum, 
cerebrospinal fluid, ascitic fluid, and synovial fluid. See id. citations, at 50-60. 
One commentator notes that, while "circumstantial epidemiologic data do not support the 
notion that these fluids represent important sources of infectivity, ... [ulntil further evidence 
substantiates their noninfectivity it is reasonable to treat all biologic fluids as potentially 
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In the laboratory, researchers postulate that hepatitis B may be 
transmitted orally through direct contact with infected saliva, for 
example by kissing, or indirectly through contact with inanimate 
objects, for example by sharing toothbrushes or baby toYS.289 Most 
experts find, however, that saliva or other body secretions contain 
such a low concentration of the antigen that transmission through 
these fluids is highly inefficient. 29o As with AIDS, transmission 
through saliva would require that large amounts of the infected fluid 
be placed in an open wound or mucous membrane; even under these 
unlikely circumstances, transmission most often does not occur. 291 
Saliva poses a speculative risk of contagion which can be mitigated 
by proper hygiene and monitoring procedures. 292 
The acute stage of hepatitis B, though quite rare, can be serious 
and may lead to death if untreated.293 The disease may also pose a 
high risk to unborn fetuses of women who contract hepatitis B in 
the latter stages of pregnancy - the fetus may have a greater 
susceptibility to cancer of the liver upon birth.294 As with AIDS, not 
all individuals who test positive for the antigen contract the disease. 
In children, the acute stage of the disease may be so mild that it is 
mistaken for a passing flu or fever. 295 Generally, hepatitis B may be 
cured with several weeks of hospitalization and treatment with a 
nutritious diet.296 There is currently no safe and effective vaccine 
available. 
infectious and to exercise care in the handling of secretions, regardless of their nature or 
origin." [d. at 19-20. 
289 [d. at 90. If peroral transmission is possible, it is presumably facilitated by the minute 
lesions in the mouth or mucous membranes which would permit direct access to the circulation. 
[d. 
290 Denz, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 136, 463 N.E.2d at 1003. 
291 [d. 
292 124 Ill. App. 3d at 137, 463 N.E.2d at 1004; Carey, 466 F. Supp. at 486. 
293 Carey, 466 F. Supp. at 482. When the hepatitis B virus is introduced into a person, it 
undergoes a two to three month incubation period. At this point one of three things can 
happen. The rarest occurrence as noted is the immediate development of the acute stage of 
the disease. Next, if the patient has developed enough antibodies, the hepatitis B antigen will 
be eliminated, the antibodies will be stored, and the patient will be immune for some time. If 
the patient does not build up enough antibodies to eliminate the antigen, he reaches an 
equilibrium where the patient still carries the antigen but is asymptomatic of the disease. As 
in AIDS, one carrier can transmit the virus to another person without either person going 
through the acute stage of the disease. Carriers may appear healthy but may undergo severe 
debilitation over time. [d. at 482-83. 
294 Ely, No. M81-3072, reprinted in 3 EHLR 553:288, at 289. 
296 Carey, 466 F. Supp. at 482. 
296 MYERS, supra note 190, at 153. Some people do not heal completely and develop chronic 
hepatitis which is manifested by a persistent, low-grade infection of the liver. [d. Chronic 
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The similarities between AIDS and these diseases suggest the 
proper balancing factors. Under the first prong of the inquiry, for a 
contagious disease to be covered as a handicap under EAHCA it 
must adversely impact a child's educational performance on a long 
term basis,297 both in the carrier and acute stage. In the acute stage, 
the debilitating physical effects of tuberculosis, hepatitis B or AIDS 
lower educational performance. As a carrier, the child not only suf-
fers certain physical symptoms, but also the stigma of suffering from 
a contagious disease. These factors combine to psychologically, if not 
physically, burden a child in his educational development even before 
he contracts the disease. 
Additionally, for a contagious disease to qualify as a handicap, it 
must pose a nonexistent or minimal risk of contagion. Because tu-
berculosis is airborne, it is highly transmissible should one of the 
rare infectious events occur. However, the fact that children rarely 
produce or expel the bacteria that cause the disease negates the 
ease with which tuberculosis could be transmitted in the school 
context. Tuberculosis, therefore, poses a low risk of contagion. Hep-
atitis B and AIDS are far less transmissible in the school context 
than tuberculosis because their transmission requires sexual or blood 
contact. There is some doubt, however, over the role of saliva in 
communicability. This doubt was balanced out in Denz, Carey and 
District 27 School Board by the preponderance of medical evidence 
against transmission through saliva, as well as by the effective mit-
igation of any such risk through the use of prophylactic measures. 
Thus, only diseases that both adversely affect a child's educational 
performance, and which pose little or no risk of transmission in the 
school context, may qualify as a handicap under this analysis. 
Under the second prong of the EAHCA inquiry, once a court 
determines that a particular disease constitutes a handicap under 
the risk analysis, it must then scrutinize that particular child's be-
havior and the stage of his disease to assess whether education of 
that child with healthy children may be achieved safely and satisfac-
torily. Any child suffering the acute stage of tuberculosis, . hepatitis 
B or AIDS would probably be too ill to attend school. Certain carrier 
children or diseased children who do not feel ill may nonetheless still 
hepatitis may be kept in remission with prolonged rest and treatment with cortisone drugs. 
Occasionally, it requires a permanent restriction on strenuous, physical activity. ld. 
291 Diseases such as chicken pox or the mumps obviously would not fit this test because, 
though contagious, they are short-lived and would not present a calculable impact on educa-
tional performance. 
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be lawfully excluded. For instance, a tuberculous child suffering from 
any stage of an upper respiratory infection that theoretically could 
produce tubercle bacilli, or an AIDS or hepatitis B child with an 
open wound could be excluded. These types of individual physical 
manifestations would bar concurrent education. 
Similarly, a child whose disease qualified as a handicap in the initial 
analysis would not satisfy the second test if his personal behavior 
patterns tended to increase the risk of exposure to infected bodily 
fluids. Such behavior patterns might include frequent incontinence, 
a tendency to bite, aggressive behavior which could draw blood, self-
mutilation, scratching, bleeding of the gums and excessive or uncon-
trollable drooling. Such children could not survive this analysis and 
a court would be justified in excluding them until such a condition 
changed. The converse of this principle, where the child's sanitary 
habits further mitigated the risk of contagion, would indicate that 
concurrent education could be successfully achieved, as exemplified 
by the habits of the plaintiff child in Denz. 
In sum, classification of a contagious disease under EAHCA would 
be limited to diseases that function as handicaps in the school con-
text. This grouping consists of diseases adversely affecting a child's 
educational performance and which pose a low risk of infection with 
the use of supplementary measures. Moreover, the stage of the 
disease in conjunction with that particular child's personal behavior 
patterns must not pose any additional risk of transmission that would 
render education with healthy children unsafe or unsatisfactory. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
During the next several years, the number of children with AIDS 
in the public schools will grow as the number of AIDS cases in the 
general population increases. As more and more children are diag-
nosed with the syndrome, advocates will be called upon with greater 
frequency to represent the interests of these children and to assert 
their right to public school education with their peers. The newness 
of the disease, the inconclusiveness of the medical research, and the 
public furor and controversy focused on AIDS, will mean that the 
litigation of these rights must be grounded in an objective legal 
scheme that cannot be undermined by societal pressure or judicial 
subjectivity. Children with contagious diseases do not constitute a 
recognized suspect class, discrimination against them thus cannot be 
analyzed under the strict scrutiny equal protection doctrine. Simi-
larly, education is not a fundamental right, thus, no strict scrutiny 
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analysis is available under the fundamental rights doctrine. The 
rational basis standard of review applicable to rulings that exclude 
children with AIDS presents a readily surmountable burden of proof 
for a school board. 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act requires a free 
appropriate public school education for all children, handicapped or 
non-handicapped, on an equal basis. Unlike the Rehabilitation Act 
that establishes only a right to attend public school, EAHCA pro-
vides a remedy. Its substantive provisions and elaborate procedural 
safeguards ensure that equal public education for the handicapped 
is not an empty guarantee. By analogy, AIDS should be classified 
as a handicap pursuant to EAHCA. 
Under the Act, a "health impaired" child is a handicapped child. 
Analysis of the statutory language, Department of Education regu-
lations and legislative intent demonstrates that AIDS constitutes a 
health impairment under the statute. While not all diseases could 
qualify as a handicap under the statute, AIDS "functions" like a 
handicap. AIDS adversely impacts a child's educational performance 
and at the same time does not present a tangible risk of contagion 
to other school children. 
Once an AIDS child qualifies as handicapped under the statute, 
he is presumptively entitled to attend public school in a regular 
classroom with his peers unless his "handicap" prevents satisfactory 
education in this environment even with supplemental aids or ser-
vices such as the CDC or state department of public health guide-
lines. 
A school board may lawfully argue that AIDS children must be 
excluded under its authority to regulate to protect public health. 
Yet, under EAHCA, any exclusionary policy is subject to a parti-
cularized inquiry, balancing the disruption, isolation and stigma such 
exclusion would work on the students against the risk of transmis-
sion. As one court noted in addressing the hepatitis B context, "[t]he 
risk of contagion cannot be ignored, but there are prophylactic mea-
sures, not necessarily as stringent ... which can be taken in order 
to reduce the risks to a de minimis level. It is not necessary to close 
the schoolhouse door to these children. "298 By classifying AIDS as a 
handicap under both the Rehabilitation Act and EAHCA, children 
with AIDS may receive the education they need and deserve on the 
local level with less frequent resort to the courts. 
298 Carey, 466 F. Sup. at 486. 
